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Introduction 
In the actual competitive landscape companies must be responsive in making strategic 
decisions, notably in “high tech” industries these decisions are often taken in a context 
of great uncertainty regarding several factors such as changes in market conditions or 
the success of the firms’ R&D process. In this framework, managers need to have 
considerable flexibility to adjust their own strategy and to refocus the company's 
resources since new information are progressively available. 
In particular, in the pharmaceutical industry, the drug R&D process is characterised by 
prolonged times, high levels of investments and very low success rate. Therefore, firms’ 
returns are characterized by high uncertainty. In this competitive landscape, 
pharmaceutical companies face more and more difficult to maintain the number of 
significant commercial drug launches each year in order to remain competitive in the 
market. In this context, closed innovation solutions, traditionally adopted by most of the 
pharmaceutical companies, are no more sustainable and firms need to look outside their 
boundaries and consider new open innovation solutions that allow to combine external 
and internal resources. Between these solutions, during last decades, strategic alliances, 
defined as “voluntary agreements between firms involving the exchange, sharing and 
co-development of products, technologies or services” (Gulati, 1998), have become 
increasingly common. 
One fundamental element to complete this picture is related to the advent of 
biotechnology, which has significantly impacted the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, 
since the eighties, pharmaceutical companies more and more have partnered with the 
newcomers, i.e. the biotechnology companies, in order to pool their complementary 
assets along the drug R&D and commercialisation processes, and succeed in the 
winner-takes-all patent race. While the “raw material” is located in biotech firms, 
pharmaceutical companies have expertise in managing advanced phases in new drug 
development (i.e., clinical stages, approvals, marketing and production) and 
considerable amounts of financial resources, of which biotech firms are lacking. In the 
same vein, due to the lack of marketing capabilities and financial resources, many 
biotech firms are intrinsically open to collaborations to innovate. 
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In an open innovation business model, a wide spectrum of alternatives is at disposal of 
firms during the R&D process. At any stage of the process, both biotech and 
pharmaceutical firms can decide whether, when and how to start, continue, abandon 
partnership with other firms, delay or dismiss the project. In particular, whether and 
when firms should collaborate is currently one of the key issues debated in the industry 
world. As a matter of fact, in recent years, the issue of R&D alliance timing has been 
extensively debated in the biopharmaceutical industry. On one hand, some industry 
insiders have recommended that biotech firms should partner with pharmaceutical 
companies during exploratory phases of the development process giving up their 
ambition of becoming big companies, like Amgen or Genentech (Napodano, 2009). On 
the other hand, some industry surveys have pointed out that, in recent years, the focus of 
small biotech firms has shifted from simply looking for capital to fund pre-
commercialization development to building clinical development and product marketing 
capabilities (Deloitte, 2005). As a result, biotech firms tend to postpone the alliance 
timing to the later stages of development and commercialization (Deloitte, 2005). These 
arguments help explain why a very large heterogeneity in R&D alliance timing is 
usually observed in the biopharmaceutical industry, for example among the top biotech 
licensing deals in 2012 (Carroll, 2012). Indeed, numerous authors have underscored the 
existence of multiple forces determining the optimal R&D alliance timing. These 
include the limited financial resources of the biotech firms, the high risk of project 
failure in early stages, the bargaining power of the parties at different stages of the 
project, as well as the presence of multiple biotech firms that oftentimes compete for 
partnering with pharmaceutical companies (Gassmann and Reepmeyer, 2005, Nicholson 
et al., 2005, Rogers et al., 2005, FierceBiotech, 2007). 
The goal of this thesis is to study alliance timing decisions from the perspective of both 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms to determine which is the optimal alliance timing 
under different conditions. This is consistent with the fact that, in the previous literature, 
alliance timing has not been sufficiently investigated and the development of an 
analytical model is missing. 
In doing so, two important characteristics of R&D alliances are considered: the 
uncertainty of the R&D process and the strategic interaction between firms. The 
evaluation of investment projects is generally done by using the Net Present Value 
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(NPV) methodology. However, in the field of R&D projects, this methodology is not 
able to correctly consider the high uncertainty, the risks, and the flexibility that 
characterize the projects. On the contrary, in recent years, the evaluation of 
pharmaceutical R&D projects through real options has been gaining growing attention, 
in order to choose the right project and avoid the risk of missing profitable 
opportunities. Specifically, on one hand, the real options approach allows to take into 
account the uncertainty and the flexibility embedded in the R&D process and to 
consider the value of future opportunities; on the other hand, the use of real options is 
perceived complex from the practitioners (Hartmann and Hassan, 2006). However, in 
case of using NPV, they should consider the risk of not properly assess the value of the 
project, while real options can provide a clearer and correct overview of future 
scenarios (Villiger and Bogdan, 2005). Therefore, in this dissertation I also investigate 
whether the use of the real options methodology has a different impact on the optimal 
alliance timing decisions as compared to the use of the traditional NPV methodology.  
Nevertheless, do not consider strategic interactions between firms often creates a partial 
picture in competitive settings, as firms’ strategies usually show interdependency. In 
order to consider also this aspect, the real options game approach has been adopted. 
Specifically, this approach is a combination of real options and game theory and it 
allows to examine the trade-off between managerial flexibility and commitment in 
dynamic competitive settings under uncertainty (Chevalier-Roignant et al., 2011). 
Therefore, with the use of real options games, firms “can presumably condition their 
decisions not only on the resolution of exogenous uncertainties but also on the 
(re)actions of outside parties (e.g., competitors)” (Chevalier-Roignant et al., 2011). 
The choice of referring in this thesis to the biopharmaceutical industry is related to its 
specific characteristics. In particular, collaborations between pharmaceutical companies 
and biotech firms are increasing and are extremely important for the development of 
new drugs, furthermore the biotechnology industry is characterized by the presence of 
many competitors (Deloitte, 2005, FierceBiotech, 2007). In addition,!the pharmaceutical 
R&D process has a long and dynamic life, and further investments depend on the 
success/failure of previous ones, which also makes the pharmaceutical R&D process an 
ideal field of application for real options. 
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Although this research context is the biopharmaceutical industry, the results and 
insights provided in this thesis can be also applied to other high-technology industries 
where collaborations are important for firms to carry out their innovation process, 
especially partnerships between a small innovator and an established incumbent. 
Particularly, environments that are characterised by a high level of competition with 
staged R&D projects and subject to significant uncertainty over market. 
In the following I will describe the outline of this thesis. 
In Chapter 1, I provide a detailed literature review of the streams of research related to 
this dissertation addressing their main research gaps and their synergic interaction. 
Specifically, in the first section I describe the main real options approaches used to 
evaluate R&D investments. In the second section I provide a detailed discussion on the 
real options games literature, which combines real options and game theory. In 
particular, I focus on the time characteristic, which allows to distinguish continuous 
time models and discrete time models. In the third section, I provide an overview on 
drug R&D process and research on alliance with a particular focus on!research on R&D 
alliances with a real options perspective and the literature on alliance timing. In the end, 
I illustrate the goal of this thesis. 
In Chapter 2, I describe the result of my collaborative work with Giovanna Lo Nigro, 
Azzurra Morreale and Paolo Roma. Specifically, I take the perspective of the biotech 
firms developing a two-stages real options game under both monopoly and duopoly 
case. In the chapter I analyse the effect of competition in biotechnology industry by 
modelling the decisions of whether and when they ally with a pharmaceutical company. 
Research findings provide threshold payments that determine different outcome 
solutions. Interestingly, depending on the level of the parameters, both players can sign 
the agreement and both stages can be optimal. 
In Chapter 3, I extend the previous model taking the perspective of the pharmaceutical 
company and this is the outcome of my collaborative work with Giovanna Lo Nigro, 
Azzurra Morreale and Paolo Roma. In this chapter in a two-stages real options game I 
suppose the presence of a pharmaceutical company that has the bargaining power to 
offer a take-it-or-leave-it contract maximizing his payoff.  
Modelling the active role of the pharmaceutical company changes the alliance timing 
significantly. In addition, I investigate the differences in the optimal alliance timing 
! 11!
when the NPV methodology, instead of the real options methodology, is utilized to 
evaluate the R&D project investment. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 I report conclusions of this thesis. I present the main theoretical 
contributions and the managerial implications. I also outline the limitations of this 
dissertation and suggest further research developments. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature review 
1.1 The real options 
The evaluation of the investments is an important issue in strategic management 
literature. The conventional approach is the Net Present Value (NPV) methodology, 
which involves the evaluation of expected cash flows deriving from the investment 
discounted at a discount rate that reflect the perceived riskiness of the project (Newton 
et al., 2004). However, especially in the field of R&D projects, where high uncertainty 
and risks are prominent, this method loses a large amount of its effectiveness. In fact, 
NPV implicitly assumes that managers will follow rigid and inflexible path. Essentially, 
NPV ignores managers’ flexibility to respond and adjust to any changes that might 
occur in the future (Myers, 1984, Hartmann and Hassan, 2006, Cassimon et al., 2011). 
So, in recent years, the evaluation of pharmaceutical R&D projects through Real 
Options Approach (ROA) has gained growing attention, in order to choose the right 
project and avoid the risk of missing profitable opportunities. In case of real options the 
underlying is a real asset and the owner has “the right, but not the obligation, to take a 
specific action in the future” (Amram and Kulatilaka 1999, p. 5). Real options allow to 
take into account uncertainty and flexibility embedded in the R&D process and consider 
the value of future opportunities. 
Similarly to the financial options, real options can be divided in call options, giving the 
right to buy the underlying asset at a predetermined price, and put options giving the 
right to sell the underlying asset at a given price. In addition, it is possible to distinguish 
between European and American options. The former can be only exercised at date of 
maturity, whereas the latter can be exercised before this date. The real options consider 
the embedded flexibility of the R&D process and interpret several possible behaviours 
of the management. Thus it is possible to distinguish between six kinds of option 
(Trigeorgis, 1997): 
• The option to defer an investment project 
• The time-to-build option 
• The option to abandon an investment project 
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• The option to contract, expand or temporarily shut down an investment 
• The option to switch input or output 
• The growth option, where an early investment allows to obtain future growth 
opportunities. 
Real options value depends on the same variables of the financial options, such as the 
underlying value, the exercise price, the volatility, the time to maturity, as well as the 
riskless interest rate; the correspondences between financial and real options are 
reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Variables that characterize financial options and their correspondent in real options. 
Variable Financial option Real option 
Underlying Current value of the stock 
Present value of the 
expected cash flows of the 
project 
Exercise price Stock price 
Present value of the 
project investment cost 
Time to 
maturity 
Expiration date of the 
stock 
Length of time in which 
the investment opportunity 
exists 
Volatility 
Volatility of returns on 
stock 
Project value volatility 
Interest rate Riskless interest rate Riskless interest rate 
 
Obviously these input parameters should be identified to estimate the real option value. 
The key parameter to evaluate is the underlying. Looking at practical examples and 
theoretical papers, in most cases the underlying is taken as the future cash flow of a 
project (Perlitz et al., 1999, p. 5). Different approaches have been used in literature to 
model the stochastic process of the underlying. Specifically, assuming continuous time 
contemplation of the underlying movements, several processes are conceivable: the 
Diffusion-Process (such as the Brownian Motion), the Jump-Process and the Mean 
Reverting process (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). For discrete time movements the Lattice 
approach can be used. About the volatility of the underlying, usually past data from the 
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volatility of completed R&D projects are used as an approximation (Perlitz et al. 1999). 
The exercise price can be known in advance or not. In the latter case, McDonald and 
Siegel (1986) suggest that it has to be replicated as a stochastic variable. Lint (2004), 
due to the fact that the exercise price is relatively short-term oriented, proposes to 
obtain reasonable estimate of this cost by means of the interviews with managers 
involved in the R&D process. The riskless interest rate can be derived from government 
bonds that have the same time to maturity as the R&D option. Regarding the time to 
maturity, it is hard to determine since real options often have a long time to maturity 
(Perlitz et al., 1999) and it can be a fixed date (as in European options) or a not known 
date by a fixed one (as in American options).  
To evaluate real options several techniques are available. In the following sub-sections, 
I review the main models available in the literature. In particular I will focus on the 
valuation of a call option, due to the fact that, in this thesis, I will consider growth 
options. In general, evaluation methodologies are distinguished between approaches 
that consider discrete stochastic process, like the binomial model (Cox et al., 1983), and 
approaches that assume continuous time stochastic process like the Black and Scholes 
model (Black and Scholes, 1973). 
1.1.1 The binomial model 
The binomial pricing approach was developed by Cox et al. (1983). The model assumes 
that the value of the underlying asset, denoted as S, follows a multiplicative binomial 
process over discrete periods. The option value C is computed, first building a tree of all 
possible discrete values that the underlying value can assume in future and then 
recurring to dynamic programming. 
Specifically, consider only one period, the current stock price S at the end of this period 
can assume two possible values, as showed in Figure 1: Su with probability q, if S has an 
increase, and Sd with probability (1-q), if S has a decrease.  
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Figure 1: Binomial pricing tree for underlying value 
In particular: 
 u = eσ Δt           (1)!
 
d = e−σ Δt = 1u          (2)!
Where σ is the standard deviation of the underlying S and Δt is the discrete time interval 
and represents the length of each interval that constitutes the tree. If n is the number of 
time steps between 0 and T (the maturity of the option), Δt is computed as T/n. In the 
model, the risk neutral probability q of an up movement is given by:  
 
q = e
rΔt − d
u − d           
(3)!
where r is the riskless rate.  The value of the option at the maturity (T) is: 
 CT = max(Si − X ;0)          (4)!
where i= u, d depending if S has gone up or down and X is the exercise price. 
Therefore, the option is exercised only if the net payoff is positive. The present value of 
the call option C is thus obtained by discounting back the two possible values of C, Cu 
and Cd, weighted by their risk-neutral probabilities, q and (1-q), respectively. As 
appropriate discount factor is used the riskless rate r. The present value of C is equal to: 
 C = e
rΔt (qCu + (1− q)Cd )         (5) 
It is possible to extend the process of the underlying S over multiple time periods, 
solving the model by dynamic programming in order to obtain the call value C at t=0. 
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When a huge number of time steps n is considered, ∆T becomes so small that the 
discrete approximation of C will converge to the Black-Scholes continuous-time value. 
1.1.2 The Black & Scholes model 
Black and Scholes (1973) analyse the option pricing problem in a continuous-time 
framework. The main assumption of the authors is that S(t), the value of the underlying 
S along t, follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). The Geometric Brownian 
Motion assumption corresponds to assuming a lognormal distribution for the underlying 
at the end of any finite interval time. 
Considering an interval of time (0, T). At the current time t=0 the holder of the option 
acquires the right, but not the obligation, to make another investment at time T, i.e. 
maturity. Make the investment at the maturity corresponds to exercise the option. At T 
new information are available, and S(T) is a known realization of the lognormal 
distribution. As above, the option will be exercised only if S(T) will exceed the exercise 
price, i.e. the option is “in the money”. Accordingly, the payoff at maturity is equal to: 
 CT = max(ST − X ;0)          (6) 
It is necessary to compute the expected value of the option at t=0. Note that the 
investment at t=0, is a sunk cost, i.e. it does not affect the option value. 
Other assumptions of the model are (Black and Scholes, 1973): 
• The riskless interest rate is known and constant through the time; 
• The variance rate of the return on the stock is constant; 
• The stock does not pay any dividend; 
• The option is “European”, i.e., it can only be exercised at maturity; 
• There are no transaction costs in buying or selling the stock; 
• It is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a security to buy it or to hold 
it, at the riskless interest rate; 
• There are no penalties to short selling. A seller who does not own a security will 
simple accept the price of the security from a buyer, and will agree to settle with 
the buyer on some future date by paying him an amount equal to the price of the 
security on that date. 
Under these assumptions, the value of the option will depend only on: the price of the 
stock, i.e. the underlying, the time and the variables that are assumed to be known 
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constants, i.e., the riskless rate, the volatility and the exercise price. In particular, the 
value of a call option C is equal to: 
 C = SN (d1)− e
−r (T−t ) XN (d2 )         (7) 
With: 
 
d1 =
ln(S X )+ (r +σ 2 2)(T − t)
σ (T − t)
       (8) 
 d2 = d1 −σ (T − t)          (9) 
Where: 
• S = the price of the underlying; 
• X = the exercise price; 
• r = the riskless interest rate; 
• T = the time to maturity; 
• t = the current time; 
• σ = the standard deviation of the stock’s returns; 
• N(.) = the cumulative normal density function. 
According to Nielsen (1993), it is possible to split the option value of equation (7) in 
two components. The first component (the second in the equation 7) represents the 
payment of the exercise price, contingent on the option finishing in the money. The 
risk-adjusted probability, P, of the event that the option will finish in the money is 
 P ST > X{ } = N (d2 ) . Thus the present payment, discounted at the riskless rate, is 
 e
−r (T−t ) XN (d2 ) . 
The second component (the first in the equation 7) is the receipt of the stock, again 
contingent on the option finishing in the money and thus is exercised. The expected 
future value of this component is not simply the conditional expectation of the stock 
price given exercise. Rather it is the conditional expectation of the stock price given 
exercise times the probability of exercise. In particular: 
 
E ST ST > X⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ P ST > X{ } = er (T−t )SN (d1)       (10) 
and at t=0 is equal to  SN (d1) .!N(d1) is the factor by which the discounted expected 
value of contingent receipt of the stock exceeds the current value of the stock (Nielsen, 
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1993, p. 5 and 6). In Figure 2 trends of the value of the call option and its components 
are reported. 
 
!
Figure 2: Trends of the value of the call option and its components 
1.1.3 The Geske model 
Starting from the Black and Sholes formula, Geske derived in 1979 a closed-form 
solution for the evaluation of an option on an option, or a 2-fold compound option. In 
case of compound options the holder of the option makes decisions in two separate 
dates. Specifically, at the expiration date of the 'inner' option, if its market price is over 
the correspondent exercise price the first option will be exercised. In this case, the 
holder will have a further option, which could be exercised at final maturity. The main 
assumptions of the model are (Geske, 1979 p. 68): 
• The changes of the value of the stock follow a random walk in continuous time 
with a variance rate proportional to the square root of the value of the firm; 
• Investors are unsatiated; 
• The security markets are perfect and competitive; 
• The riskless interest rate is known and is constant through time; 
• The trading takes place continuously in time; 
!!
!!
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• The firm has no pay outs. 
As above, the value of the option depends only on the the underlying, the time and 
constant variables. Specifically, the value of a call option C is: 
 C = SN2(a1,a2;ρ)− e
−r (t2−t ) X2N2(b1,b2;ρ)− e
−r (t1−t ) X1N (b2 )     (11) 
With: 
 
b1 =
ln(S S )+ (r −σ 2 2)(t1 − t)
σ (t1 − t)
       (12) 
 
b2 =
ln(S X2 )+ (r −σ
2 2)(t2 − t)
σ (t2 − t)
       (13) 
 a1 = b1 +σ (t1 − t)          (14) 
 a2 = b2 +σ (t2 − t)          (15) 
 
ρ =
(t1 − t)
(t2 − t)
          (16) 
Where: 
• S = the price of the underlying; 
•  S = the solution of  C1(S ,t1)− X1 = 0 ; 
• σ = the standard deviation of the stock’s returns; 
• r = the riskless interest rate; 
• t = the current time; 
• t1 = the time to maturity of the compound option C; 
• t2 = the time to maturity of the underlying call option; 
• X1 = the exercise price of the compound option C; 
• X2 = the exercise price of the underlying call option; 
• N(.) = the cumulative normal density function; 
• N2(.) = the bivariate cumulative normal distribution function with  a1  and  a2  as 
upper limits and ρ !as the correlation coefficient between the two variables. 
The Geske model is particularly suitable for evaluation of staged R&D projects, 
constituted of a series of consecutive phases, where the management moves on to the 
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next stage of the product development only if the expected results are satisfactory. In 
fact, each phase of the R&D process represents an option on executing the following 
phase, i.e. a compound option. 
Perlitz et al. (1999) provide an application of the Geske model to a project in the 
pharmaceutical industry. For the sake of simplicity, the authors consider the R&D 
process divided into three main phases (see Figure 3). In phase 1 an active substance is 
identified as promising enough between numerous possible compounds. Once a 
substance has been identified, the testing phase, i.e., 2, starts. If this phase turns to be 
successfully completed, then the pharmaceutical company can make an ulterior 
investment in production capacity and market introduction and the drug can be 
commercialized. Two options are identified in this setting: the first option is the 
possibility to invest in testing; the second option is the investment in production 
capacity and market introduction. Taken together, these opportunities form a compound 
option, i.e., a 2-fold option, which can be evaluated by the Geske formula. 
 
!
Figure 3: Simplified illustration of the drug R&D process. 
At t0, the company makes an initial investment (as above this is a sunk cost that does 
not affect the compound option value) to buy the compound option. If the asset value at 
time t1, exceeds the investment cost X1, i.e. phase 1 has been successfully completed, 
the first option is exercised and the company buys the right to exercise the second 
option at t2. At that date, if the asset value exceeds the production and market cost X2, 
the pharmaceutical company will exercise the second option too. Thus, the entire 
compound option is exercised. 
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The main limitation of the Geske model is that it is appropriate to evaluate only 2-fold 
compound options. However, it could be difficult, in the real markets, divide the R&D 
project in only two phases. In fact, very often R&D processes are constituted of several 
stages, thus they are represented by n-fold compound options and the Geske formula is 
not applicable. Cassimon et al. (2004) provide a generalisation of Geske’s compound 
option model, deriving a solution for a n-fold compound option. 
1.1.4 Conclusions on real options methodology 
Traditional NPV methodology fails in the evaluation of the R&D projects due to the 
hypothesis of static cash flows. In fact, projects are assumed to proceed as planned, 
regardless of future events (Newton et al., 2004) and their value may be underestimated 
because it is not taken into account management's ability to update decisions, as new 
information arrive. Also, it does not take into account the dual role of risk: high risk, i.e. 
high volatility, can lead to a possible reduction in the value of the project, but can also 
be associated with the possibility of obtaining more revenues. Therefore, NPV is 
suitable for evaluating investments in static environments. 
On the contrary, real options enable companies or managers to value projects by 
incorporating managerial flexibilities into the valuation model. Although, ROA is 
recognized by the academia as very suitable to overcome the limitations of NPV, the 
use of real options in new project evaluation is quite limited. This is mainly because 
practitioners perceive real options as a considerably complex tool (Hartmann and 
Hassan, 2006). However, several studies suggest how the use of different 
methodologies has a relevant impact on firms’ decisions. For instance, Krychowski and 
Quèlin (2010) investigate alliance timing in a real case in the mobile telecommunication 
industry under NPV and ROA framework and find out that ROA produces the opposite 
recommendation in investment timing (delay the investment) as the NPV does (invest 
now). Also Cassimon et al. (2011) show that the licensing deal value is highly affected 
by the methodology utilized to evaluate the investment project. 
Among scholars who have adopted ROA as a tool to evaluate R&D project, Cassimon 
et al. (2011) develop a model in the multi-phase R&D project in the pharmaceutical 
sector. They incorporate technical risk in a compound option models, still preserving 
the closed-form solution. 
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Rogers et al. (2002) develop a stochastic optimization model to select the optimal 
portfolio, always in the pharmaceutical industry. Authors use the binomial tree, in 
particular they adopt a quadranomial approach, i.e. a two-variable binomial tree, that 
allows to model both technological and market uncertainty. Each project development 
stage is modelled as a series of continuation/abandonment options, deciding at each 
phase, whether to proceed further or stop the development. 
Regarding uncertainty evaluated through ROA, it can be differentiated into technical 
uncertainty and economic uncertainty. The former deals with the uncertainty on R&D 
costs and factors that can influence the R&D product success, e.g. approval probability. 
Economic uncertainty is related to the factors that can affect market uncertainty, like 
interest rates, inflation, and changes in the industry. This kind of risk is systematic, i.e. 
is independent from the actions of the firm.  
The evaluation methodologies, as specified above, use discrete approaches, like the 
binomial model, or continuous approaches, like Black and Scholes. Adopting binomial 
model, due to the fact that it is a numerical approach, allows to manage a wide range of 
application. However, this method shows some limitations (Cassimon et al., 2004, 
2011). In particular, the first problem arises with the choice of the up (u) and down 
ratios (d) and the risk of neutral probabilities (q). A second problem is due to the fact 
that is not known how many time steps are necessary in order to obtain an accurate 
option price. Black and Scholes formula provides a closed-form solution. The main 
limitations are that Black and Scholes can’t evaluate American put and the assumption 
of GBM distribution for the underlying. In fact, this implies a continuous arrival of 
information that changes the underlying value (Pennings & Lint, 1997). However, 
information that affects the underlying value arrives at discrete points of time and this 
means that the managers, in real markets, do not continuously adjust the underlying 
value, but only when information with strategic impact arrives (Pennings & Lint, 1997). 
However, the continuous time assumption of Black and Scholes, and also Geske model, 
allows for closed-form solutions that makes the handling easier (Perlitz et al. 1999, p 
264). In general, the choice of the model depends to the specific problem to address and 
no unique recipe can be provided ex ante (Munari and Oriani, 2011). 
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1.2 The Real Options Games 
Firms not operate alone in the market, indeed, in determining their strategic investment 
decisions, they should consider the presence of other competitors. 
For example, in a case study reported by Ferreira et al. (2009), is reported the story of 
MineCo. MineCo is examining the opportunity of expanding her production capacity. 
Her idea is to open a new mine in her regional market. This market is affected by 
uncertainty. In particular, if the demand exceeds the local supply, customers have the 
possibility to import resources from foreign sources resulting in a limitation on prices. 
Moreover MineCo supposes that CompCo, her largest competitor, may invest in a 
similar project. In this scenario there are two sources of uncertainty that MineCo should 
consider to establish her strategy: on one hand the uncertainty related to the demand 
level and, on the other hand, the strategic interactions with her competitor. Four 
different strategic scenarios are possible: both companies invest now, both companies 
wait, MineCo invests and CompCo waits and vice-versa. Authors analyse the four 
scenarios and find out that the optimal strategy for both firms is that MineCo invests 
now while CompCo waits (firms’ profits will be $M35 and $M2 respectively). In fact, 
neither of them has interest to deviate from this behaviour otherwise they will get a 
lower profit; for example if CompCo decides to invest now as well, moving to the first 
scenario, she will lose $195 million. Therefore, while for MineCo the commitment 
value created by investing now is higher than flexibility value from delaying, the better 
strategy for CompCo is waiting. 
MineCo’s case shows the existence of a trade-off between making timely strategic 
investment to pre-empt the rivals and incurring in the risks related with unresolved 
market uncertainty. In order to take into account both the aspects a proper valuation 
method should be adopted. Real Options Games (ROGs) are a valuation tool that 
combine Real Options Approach with Game Theory and allow firms to adapt their 
strategies to a changing market environment, considering the importance of making an 
early investment commitment while maintaining managerial flexibility (Smit and 
Trigeorgis, 2007). 
In a Real Options Game model the players of the game are usually the firms that hold 
the investment opportunity and they are also assumed to be rational. Usually the 
strategies available for the players are the choices of making the investment or defer 
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such a decision and their payoffs are the firms’ net cash flows coming from the 
investment. In particular, the present value of these cash flows is a stochastic variable 
that follows a known process1 and the investment cost is sunk and fixed. To fully define 
the game, it is necessary to specify which kind of information is available for firms 
(Azevedo and Paxson, 2014). In particular, there can be perfect (or imperfect 
information), which means all the action of the other players are (not) known, and 
complete (or incomplete information), which means that players’ strategies and payoffs 
are (not) common knowledge (Azevedo and Paxson, 2010). 
Once the players’ payoffs are calculated, the solution of the game can be determined 
using Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium holds when game players choose a set of 
strategies with the property that no firm has interest to deviate from its behaviour. 
Usually ROG models can be divided into two main categories, depending on the firms’ 
investment decisions are made under the assumption of continuous time or discrete 
time. In the following I will report the game theoretic/RO framework foundations to 
explain how this kind of models work. In addition I will analyse, for both categories, 
their main assumptions and characteristics and describe the most interesting contributes. 
1.2.1 Continuous-time ROG 
Most of the literature on ROG focuses on continuous-time ROG. This stream of 
research starts with the study of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), which provides the game-
theoretical foundations for the adoption of new technology in a deterministic 
framework. Smets (1993) was the first to develop a RO model considering also 
competition in his PhD dissertation thesis. Starting from his work, Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994, chapter 6 and 9) develop a pre-emption game, which will be the standard 
investment model for leader-follower competition setting under uncertainty. 
In the model2 two identical firms have the possibility to invest at a cost I in the same 
irreversible project and they need to find the optimal timing for the investment. It is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Usually a GBM.!
2 The reader can find the presentation of the standard investment model in Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994), Grenadier (1996), Pawlina and Kort (2006). !
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assumed that both firms are risk-neutral, time is continuous and infinite. Cash flows 
expected from the investment are uncertain and the price of a unit of output is equal to: 
 P(t) = X (t)D Q(t)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦          (17) 
where D is the inverse demand function (with D’<0), Q(t) is the industry supply process 
and X is a multiplicative demand shock and evolves as a geometric Brownian motion: 
 dX = µXdt +σ Xdz          (18) 
where dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process. The constant µ is the drift 
parameter and represents the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in X 
per unit time and the constant σ is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per 
unit time. 
The authors derive firms’ optimal investment thresholds and their value functions. 
Using the backward induction, first is determined the follower’s values function, 
denoted as FF(X). Specifically, it must satisfy in equilibrium the following differential 
equation: 
 
1
2
σ 2 X 2
∂2 FF ( X )
∂X 2
+ µX
∂FF ( X )
∂X
− rFF ( X ) = 0      (19) 
Where r is the riskless interest rate. Equation (19) must be solved subject to specific 
boundary conditions and will exist a trigger value, XF, such that the follower will 
exercise the option to invest the first time that X(t) equals or exceeds XF. The conditions 
are: 
 
FF ( X F ) =
X F D(2)
r − µ          
(20) 
 
FF
' ( X F ) =
D(2)
r − µ          
(21) 
Note that, working with backward induction, at the moment of the investment decision 
of the follower, the leader has already invested. Thus, in the market both firms are 
active and the industry output is indicated ad D(2).  
The first boundary condition (equation 20) is the “value-matching” condition. It reflects 
the fact that, at the moment of exercise, the payoff of the option is the expected present 
value of the duopoly cash flows in perpetuity minus the cost of the investment. The 
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second boundary condition (equation 21) is the “high-contact” or “smooth-pasting” 
condition. It ensures that XF, is the trigger that maximizes the value of the follower’s 
option. 
Solving the equilibrium differential equation in (19), subject to the above boundary 
conditions, results in the following follower’s values function and follower’s investment 
threshold: 
 
FF ( X ) =
1
β −1
X
X F
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
β
 if X < X F
XD(2)
r − µ
− I      if X ≥ X F
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
       (22) 
 
X F =
β
β −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
r − µ
D(2)
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
I         (23) 
Where 
 
β = 1
2
− r −δ
σ 2
+ r −δ
σ 2
− 1
2
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
2
+ 2r
σ 2        
(24) 
Where =-r. Going back, the leader’s value function is influenced by the follower’s 
exercise strategy and is equal to: 
 
FL( X ) =
XD(1)
r − µ
− I + D(2)− D(1)
D(2)
β
β −1
I X
X F
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
β
  if X < X F
XD(2)
r − µ
                                                      if X ≥ X F
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
   (25) 
The leader’s investment threshold, XL, can be derived equalizing equation (22) and 
equation (25) for X< XF, replacing X with XL and solving for XL. 
Leader’s and follower’s value functions are showed in Figure 4, it is possible to 
individuate three regions. At any point below XF, each player would prefer being the 
follower and no entry occurs. At any point between XF and XL each player would prefer 
being the leader. Specifically, firms will invest according to the principle of rent 
equalization explained by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). At point XP, the leader’s value 
function has the maximum value, thus both firms would prefer invest at this threshold. 
However, due to the presence of a first mover advantage, each firm has fear of being 
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pre-empted by the competitor and if they invest an instant before the competitor they 
will get a payoff advantage. This behaviour continues until X(t) reach the threshold XL 
where the leader’s and follower’s value functions are equal. At this threshold one firm 
invests and enjoys temporary monopoly profit. The other player waits until XF is 
reached, at any point over XF both players are active in the market. 
 
!
Figure 4: Leader’s and follower’s value functions. 
The pre-emption game is the most common model treated in the literature on 
continuous time games. Specifically, this branch of the literature usually focuses on 
symmetric duopoly model, where firms act non-cooperatively and authors derive firms’ 
optimal thresholds. The main contribution of these papers is to apply ROG setting in 
particular markets or consider factors that can influence the value of the option. 
For example, Grenadier (1996) develops a duopoly investment game to study the 
behaviour of real estate markets. In the model two building owners hold the option to 
develop a new superior building. The exercise of the option does not yield immediate 
payoffs, indeed should be considered the time-to-build, i.e. the period necessary for the 
construction that varies across property types (e.g., residential, office or industrial 
buildings). The author shows that the development options could be exercised 
sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the initial state of demand, X(0). If X(0) is 
below XF, leader (randomly selected) will initiate development the first moment that 
X(t) equals or exceeds XL, while the follower waits until X(t) rises to XF. If X(0)>XF, one 
!
!
XF  XL  XP  
!
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firm will begin construction and the other will enter instantaneously thereafter. 
Grenadier suggests empirical implications for his model explaining how “development 
cascade” occurs more frequently when demand volatility increases and also “recession-
induced construction boom” is more likely with greater time-to-build and volatility. 
Huisman and Kort (2003) and Huisman and Kort (2004) analyse strategic technology 
adoption investment decisions. Two identical firms can initially invest in a current 
technology, knowing that later a new and more efficient technology becomes available 
for the adoption. In particular in Huisman and Kort (2003) information is complete, i.e. 
firms know when the new technology will be available, and if one firm has invested in 
the current technology she may replace it with the new one with a less cost. Depending 
on the investment scenario, they arrive at several different game equilibrium strategies 
with first mover advantage or second mover advantage. Anyway the mathematical 
formulation of the model is deterministic. In Huisman and Kort (2004), authors relax 
the assumption of complete information, indeed the time at which the new technology is 
available is distributed according to an exponential distribution, so that the arrival of 
this technology follows a Poisson process with parameter k. Different strategies are 
pursued according to the value of k. When the probability that the new technology 
becomes available soon is high, firms will wait for the adoption of this one. When this 
probability is not high enough, two patterns of investment behaviour may arise: usual 
pre-emption game, i.e. each firm tries to be the first investor, and the firm that will 
invest second can choose to invest for the new technology or not; attrition game, there is 
a second-mover advantage, i.e. both firms would like to be the follower, at the end one 
firm will invest and the other will wait for the new technology. It is important to notice 
that with no technological progress opportunity, the model exactly equals the one 
treated in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
Mason and Weeds (2010) analyse irreversible investment in a project with uncertain 
returns in a dynamic two-player model with the aim to investigate how equilibrium 
outcomes are affected by the threat of pre-emption. They find out that in presence of 
positive externalities, greater uncertainty can accelerate rather than delay investment. 
This is because uncertainty can raise the leader’s value more than the follower’s. Pre-
emptive reasoning entails that the leader must act sooner, therefore considering strategic 
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interactions and externalities have important effects in investment decisions in contrast 
to the standard real options thinking. 
These authors gave important contributions to ROG literature. However, over time, 
scholars have relaxed some assumptions of the model above considered and have 
developed extensions to get closer to a more realistic scenario. 
In particular, some authors focus their attention on market with several firms (Williams, 
1993, Grenadier, 1999, 2002, Aguerrevere, 2009). For example, Grenadier (1999) 
investigates how, with imperfect information, the signal effect of the observed actions 
of other players influence firms’ exercise decision. He considers an oligopoly with n 
agents that hold an identical option which can be exercised at any time. In the model 
there is imperfect information since every agent does not know his exact payoff at the 
moment of option exercise and all the agents will take their exercise decision founding 
not only on their own private signal but also on the signals (exercise decisions) of other 
agents. In particular, the author assumes that agents differ in the quality of their private 
information, therefore the forecast accuracy of their future payoffs (i.e. their signals) is 
decreasing, i.e. the forecast of Agent 1 is more precise that the forecast of Agent 2 and 
so on. The intuition for the equilibrium is: if Agent 1 has a positive signal, the expected 
value of exercising is high and he will not wait to learn from Agent 2's actions, 
otherwise, if the signal is low he will wait and copy Agent 2's actions. Agent 2 has 
observed Agent 1's actions and will proceed to exercise optimally and so on until Agent 
n. Anyway a suboptimal equilibrium arises when an informational cascade occurs. In 
case of informational cascade agents will ignore their private information and instead 
emulate the behaviour of previous actors, i.e. whenever two consecutive agents reveal 
positive signals. 
Other authors relax the restrictive assumption that the duopolistic rivals are identical 
and consider several degree of asymmetry. In this field, Pawlina and Kort (2006) 
investigate options exercise decisions in case of investment cost asymmetry. Firms 
differ for the required sunk cost associated with the investment and the magnitude of 
this cost asymmetry is indicated as κ. Authors identify three different equilibrium 
strategies according to the level of κ and the level of the first-mover advantage, i.e. the 
ratio between the profit of being leader and the profit of duopoly (see Figure 5). In case 
the cost disadvantage is relatively small and the first-mover advantage is high, pre-
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emptive equilibrium holds; when there is no significant first-mover advantage, firms 
invest simultaneously and, finally, when the degree of cost asymmetry is significantly 
high, firms invest sequentially and the leader simply maximizes the value of its 
investment opportunity. 
 
!
Figure 5: Equilibrium areas in Pawlina and Kort (2006). 
Kong and Kwok (2007) extend firms’ asymmetry in both sunk cost of investment and 
revenue flows. Authors provide a complete analysis of strategic equilibriums in both 
cases of positive externalities and negative externalities. Under positive externalities, 
there is not pre-emptive pressure and simultaneous or sequential entry equilibrium are 
possible. In case of negative externalities, when one firm dominates the other, firms 
enter at their respective leader’s and follower’s optimal thresholds, without dominance, 
the threat of pre-emption by the rival leads to pre-emptive or simultaneous entry 
equilibrium. 
Weeds (2002) presents a model in which two firms have the possibility to make an 
irreversible investment in competing research projects to obtain the same patent. The 
technological success of the project is probabilistic following a Poisson process and the 
economic value of the patent evolves stochastically following a GBM. Even if she 
develops a winner-takes-all game, she also provides the investment thresholds for a 
cooperative scenario. In the latter scenario, the form of the equilibrium depends on the 
! κ  
! First-mover cost advantage  
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relative magnitudes of the leader's value and both sequential leader-follower 
equilibrium and a joint-investment outcome are possible. In particular, for simultaneous 
investment the effect of non-cooperative behaviour is to increase the time to first 
investment as compared to the case of cooperative scenario, as each firm holds back 
from investing in the fear of starting a patent race. 
1.2.2 Discrete-time ROG 
Under the assumption of discrete time, ROG models are less common in the literature. 
In general, some scholars derive frameworks that provide basic principles of ROG 
mechanism suggesting how apply ROG logic in the real market while others papers 
develop models that analyse more complicated settings. In case of discrete time, games 
are usually settled in two stages and are represented in the extensive form. Specifically, 
in a two-stages discrete-time model the choice to “invest” or to “defer” is made in two 
possible moments by both firms. 
Among these works, one of the first contributions is given by Smit and Ankum (1993). 
They use the binomial lattice to analyse the option to defer investment in production 
facilities. First, they consider, a duopoly where firms have equally market power and in 
this case the game takes the form of a classic prisoner’s dilemma: both firms choose to 
invest while this is a suboptimal solution. Subsequently they suppose the presence of 
asymmetry between firms, in this case the dominant firm enjoys his competitive 
advantage. The equilibrium of the game depends on the evolution of the market: if it 
turns out to be favourable, and a large net present value is expected, the dominant firm 
will invest early, otherwise she will postpone the project. Conversely, the firm in a 
weak position will defer the investment until the market develops sufficiently. 
Smit and Trigeorgis (2006, 2007) analyse investment opportunities, with examples and 
cases, that involve important competitive/strategic decisions under uncertainty and 
provide several insights for firms’ competitive strategies. In Smit and Trigeorgis (2007), 
authors describe different principles for analysing competitive strategies under 
uncertainty, analysing both one-stage investment games and two-stage investment 
games adapting firms’ competitive investment strategies to Fudenberg & Tirole (1984) 
framework. Authors suggest that in presence of competition in technological 
innovation, while firms usually face a winner-takes-all situation starting a race to pre-
empt each other, a cooperation strategy, i.e. joint research venture, may be more 
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appropriate and profitable. In Smit and Trigeorgis (2006), authors discuss several 
examples underlining how firm’s decision has an impact on competitors and in 
determining equilibrium outcomes and competitive strategies. The aim of their work is 
to show the potentiality of the use of ROG approach especially for oligopolistic and 
innovative industries, e.g. consumer electronics, telecommunications or 
pharmaceuticals. 
The main limitation of these papers is that they provide only numerical approaches, but 
there are also present several works that develop deepened analytical treatment.  
Among them, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) analyse a two-stage duopoly game in both 
the case where firms could decide simultaneously on the investment and the case of 
asymmetric Stackelberg game. Firms, in the first stage, have the opportunity to make an 
initial irreversible investment in a growth option which confers, in the second stage, a 
lower cost production than for competitors without growth options. In the second stage 
there is Cournot competition. In case of Stackelberg game, strategic investment is 
optimal for the leader when the level of expected demand exceeds the indifference 
threshold while the follower will enter in the market for a higher threshold. The entry 
point for the leader depends on the magnitude of the strategic advantage, i.e. the 
production cost for the follower. In particular, high level of strategic advantage implies 
that the investment has a strong entry dissuasion effect, therefore a high level of 
uncertainty encourages the investment; otherwise, if the strategic effect is weak, the 
uncertainty deters the investment. In case of log-normally distributed demand Black-
Scholes-like solutions hold. In case of simultaneous investments neither player can 
condition its strategy on the other firm decision, so the solution will be simultaneous 
investment or no investment by both firms depending on the level of demand 
uncertainty and strategic advantage as before. 
Murto et al. (2004) consider an oligopoly game several firms produce a homogeneous 
product, whose demand evolves stochastically, and each of them has a set of discrete 
investment opportunities available to adjust their production cost functions or 
production capacities. After the equilibrium strategies of the firms are derived, authors 
use simulation Monte Carlo to analyse a duopoly asymmetric case where one firm has 
the possibility to make smaller investments with higher cost per unit and for the other 
firm the reverse holds. Results offer a good picture of the trade-off between the value of 
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flexibility and scale economies under competition, in particular the more flexible firm is 
in general more able to adapt to demand changes, while the other firm takes advantage 
from very high demand growth. Anyway the use of Monte Carlo simulation brings 
some limitations due to the heavy computing capacity required, e.g. analysis is 
restricted to the duopoly case. 
Martzoukos and Zacharias (2013) demonstrate how two competing firms can act 
strategically and take advantage of the positive spillovers, or take pre-emptive action 
against the negative spillovers. Specifically, they developed a two-stage game in 
presence of spillover effects. In the first stage, firms determine, between a discrete 
number of alternatives, their optimal level of coordination (research/technology policy 
choice). In the second-stage tactical decision, firms choose the optimal effort for a given 
level of the spillover effects and the cost of information acquisition. In this stage the 
Black & Scholes formula is adopted but!there is no further interaction between the two 
firms. Authors also find that, under learning-by-doing hypothesis and in presence of 
switching costs for strategy revision, strategy shifts are easier to observe for dominant 
firms and in market environments of high growth and high volatility. 
Despite their little implementation, discrete-time ROGs, as well underlined by Smit and 
Trigeorgis (2007), represent a flexible approach that allow to preserve many important 
features like the tractability of the paths in the model, the opportunity of incorporating 
strategic features necessary for a realistic setting, underlying stochastic processes (e.g. 
Brownian motion) and exogenous chance of competitive entry. 
1.2.3 Conclusions on ROG literature 
In Table 2 the main contributions and characteristics of the works analysed in this 
section are summarized. Note that time can be discrete (D) or continuous (C), 
information can be complete (C) or incomplete (I) and firms can be symmetric (S) or 
asymmetric (A). 
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Table 2: Main contributions of ROG literature. 
Authors 
(Year) 
Title Journal 
Tim
e 
N. of 
firm
s 
Info
rmat
ion 
Symm
etry 
Contribution 
Dixit & 
Pindyck 
(1994) 
Investment 
Under 
Uncertainty.  
Princeton 
University 
Press. 
C 2 C S 
Develop a pre-
emption game 
to evaluate 
optimal 
thresholds for 
investments 
under 
uncertainty. 
Grenadier 
(1996) 
The strategic 
exercise of 
options: 
Development 
cascades and 
overbuilding 
in real estate 
markets.  
Journal of 
Finance 
C 2 C S 
Develop a pre-
emption game 
in the real 
estate markets. 
Grenadier 
(1999) 
Information 
Revelation 
through 
Option 
Exercise. 
The Review 
of Financial 
Studies 
C n I S 
Equilibrium 
framework for 
option exercise 
games with 
asymmetric 
private 
information. 
Analyses the 
occurrence of 
an 
informational 
cascade 
Huisman 
& Kort 
(2004) 
Strategic 
technology 
adoption 
European 
Journal of 
Operational 
C 2 I S 
Take into 
account 
technological 
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taking into 
account future 
technological 
improvements
: A real 
options 
approach. 
Research progress in 
making 
investment 
decisions. 
According to 
the rate of 
arrival of the 
new techno-
logy, pre-
emption game 
or war of 
attrition may 
arise. 
Kong & 
Kwok 
(2007) 
Real options 
in strategic 
investment 
games 
between two 
asymmetric 
firms. 
European 
Journal of 
Operational 
Research 
C 2 C A 
Analyse how 
asymmetry on 
both the sunk 
cost of 
investment and 
revenue flows 
of the two firms 
affect the 
optimal 
investment 
thresholds. 
Kulatilak
a & 
Perotti 
(1998) 
Strategic 
growth 
options. 
Management 
Science 
D 2 C S/A 
Two-stage 
duopoly game. 
Investments in 
strategic growth 
options are 
encouraged 
when 
uncertainty 
increases. 
Martzou-
kos & 
Real option 
games with 
Omega D 2 I S 
Two-stage 
duopoly game. 
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Zacharias 
(2013) 
R&D and 
learning 
spillovers.  
Determine the 
optimal level of 
coordination 
and the optimal 
effort in 
presence of the 
spillover 
effects. 
Mason & 
Weeds 
(2010) 
Investment, 
uncertainty, 
and pre-
emption.  
Internationa
l Journal of 
Industrial 
Organizatio
n 
C 2 C S 
In a pre-
emption game, 
in presence of 
positive 
externali-ties, 
greater uncer-
tainty can 
accelerate 
rather than 
delay 
investment. 
Murto et 
al. (2004) 
Timing of 
investments in 
oligopoly 
under 
uncertainty: A 
framework for 
numerical 
analysis.  
European 
Journal of 
Operational 
Research 
D n C S/A 
Analyse trade-
off between the 
value of 
flexibility and 
scale 
economies 
under 
competition, 
using Monte 
Carlo 
simulation. 
Pawlina 
& Kort 
(2006) 
Real options 
in an 
asymmetric 
duopoly: Who 
benefits from 
Journal of 
Economics 
& 
Management 
Strategy 
C 2 C A 
Study the 
effects of 
investment 
costs 
asymmetry on 
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your 
competitive 
disadvantage?  
the optimal real 
option exercise 
strategies and 
the value of 
duopolistic 
firms. 
Smets 
(1993) 
Essays on 
Foreign Direct 
Investment.  
PhD thesis C 2 C S 
The first paper 
in real options 
litera-ture to 
consider 
interactions 
between firms. 
Smit & 
Ankum 
(1993) 
A real options 
and game-
theoretic 
approach to 
corporate 
investment 
strategy under 
competition.  
Financial 
Management 
D 2 C S/A 
Using binomial 
lattice, develop 
a numerical 
example to 
analyse the 
option to defer 
investment, for 
both symmetric 
and asymmetric 
firms. 
Smit & 
Trigeorgi
s (2006) 
Real options 
and games: 
Compe-tition, 
alliances and 
other 
applications 
of valuation 
and strategy. 
Review of 
Financial 
Economics 
D 2 C S 
Use examples 
from innovation 
cases in 
consumer 
electronics and 
telecommunicat
ion industries. 
Focus on 
whether it is 
optimal to 
compete 
independently 
or 
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coordinate/colla
borate via 
strategic 
alliances. 
Smit & 
Trigeorgi
s (2007) 
Strategic 
options and 
games in 
analyzing 
dynamic 
technology 
investments.  
Long Range 
Planning. 
D 2 C S 
Develop a 
framework to 
analyse 
competitive 
strategies under 
uncertainty. 
Weeds 
(2002) 
Strategic 
Delay in a 
Real Options 
Model of 
R&D 
Competition. 
The Review 
of Economic 
Studies 
C 2 C S 
Model 
competition to 
develop a new 
patent. 
Consider both 
cooperative and 
non- 
cooperative 
scenarios. 
 
Nevertheless real options game literature has been developed only recently, it is 
emerging as a methodology for evaluating investment decisions. Indeed, ROG allows 
understanding firms’ behaviours no longer in monopoly settings but also when several 
firms act in the market affecting their expected profits each other. Therefore this 
framework is particularly relevant as firms in the real market usually have to take their 
investment decisions under conditions of uncertainty and competition with rivals. 
There are several directions for future researches that could allow extending ROG 
analysis to more complex and diversified scenarios. For instance, usually in ROG 
literature, investment choices available for firms are strictly defined (e.g., investment in 
the project or not) in a horizontal competition setting, whereas real-life investments 
often include a lot of different choices. Specifically, in the current competitive scenario, 
where cooperation outside the boundaries of the firms is one of the key factors of 
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success, scholars may find interesting to consider alliance setting or vertical competition 
setting. 
Finally, the main issue to deal with is the applicability of the models. Indeed, most of 
the works have been focused on analytically derivation not focusing on the possibility 
of a real application of this methodology by practitioners. In this context, on one side, 
benchmarking empirical studies can help to contextualize these models in the real 
markets and to individuate the most promising research streams (Azevedo and Paxson, 
2014); on the other side, it is possible to increase the development of discrete-time 
approaches and simulation tools, that are more flexible and easy to manage for 
practitioners (Chevalier-Roignant et al., 2011). 
1.3 The pharmaceutical R&D process and the alliances 
New drug development has become considerably challenging in recent years: while 
length and cost of R&D have been growing, chances of success have become extremely 
low. As a matter of fact, pharmaceutical companies have invested more than $500 
billion in R&D into medical innovations since 2000, with an estimated $48.5 billion 
only in 2012. In contrast, only 43 new medicines were approved by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in 2012, being the highest number in the last 15 years 
(Phrma, 2013). 
This setting is related with the intrinsic characteristics of the new drug R&D process. A 
drug may spend 10-15 years in the developmental process (Robinson and Stuart, 2007) 
and cost, on average, $300 million to bring to market (Rogers et al., 2002). The 
development starts with the discovery phase where thousands of compounds are tested 
in order to find one that can achieve a desirable result. The most promising compounds 
enter the pre-clinical testing. In this phase compounds are tested in animals, both in 
vitro and in vivo. If the pre-clinical phase turns out to be successful, the drug candidate!
starts clinical trials that are constituted of three phases. In phase I, 20–80 healthy 
volunteers test for safety and dosage. Phase II involves 100–300 patient volunteers used 
to test for efficacy and side effects. Phase III includes 1000–5000 patient volunteers in 
order to test the effectiveness of the drug. Using double-blind studies with placebos, it 
must be shown that the new drug works better than the existing treatment. If the clinical 
tests are successful a new! drug application (NDA) is filed with the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). Once approval is obtained, the pharmaceutical company can 
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enter the commercialisation phase and has the right to sell the drug under a trademark 
protected by a patent (Cassimon et al., 2004). Of 5,000–10,000 screened chemical 
entities in the discovery phase, 250 enter the pre-clinical testing and only five will enter 
in the clinical phases (Cassimon et al., 2004). Therefore this process is characterized by 
technological uncertainty. Also market uncertainty is present, due to the incomplete 
information regarding the cost of producing the drug, the eventual pricing structure, and 
the captured market share (Rogers et al., 2002).  
Despite these difficulties, big pharmaceutical companies cannot avoid relying on R&D 
activities, and keep considering them as a major source of value creation, in spite of 
their intrinsic risks. To achieve this goal, pharmaceutical companies more and more 
consider new paradigm solutions including next-generation licensing (Kleyn and 
Kitney, 2007) and effective pre-competitive collaboration with other companies 
(Dhankhar et al., 2012). 
In particular, from the advent of biotechnology in the eighties, pharmaceutical 
companies more and more have entered into alliances with the biotechnology 
companies, pooling their complementary assets, with successful results. From one side, 
biotech firms have expertise on new drug discovery technologies, which rely on 
microbiology and genomics. Pharmaceutical companies are larger, can benefit from 
economies of scale and scope in conducting clinical trials, have more experience in the 
FDA approval process, manufacturing, marketing and sales. In addition, they have 
considerable amounts of financial resources, of which biotech firms are lacking. 
Therefore, large pharmaceutical companies rely increasingly on alliances to supplement 
their drug pipelines (Nicholson et al., 2005) and biotech firms rely on alliances with 
established firms for access to capital (Majewski, 1998), and for access to product 
markets!(Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). This has determined a change from the traditional 
“closed innovation” business model to the “open innovation” (OI) business model 
(Bianchi et al., 2011). 
Alliances have been widely studied in the literature analysing several key aspects 
involved in the alliance process. Between these aspects Bianchi et al. (2011) underline 
that three main decisions, on which pharmaceutical company should focus, are the 
organisational modes through which the firms set up their partnership, the type of 
partner with which enter in relationship and in which phase of R&D process signing the 
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agreement. Many scholars have analysed the governance of R&D alliance (Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004, Bosse & Alvarez, 2010, Pangarkar & Klein, 2001, Das and Teng, 
2001) and partner selection (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, Danzon et al, 2005). The 
most popular theories that have been used are the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
(Williamson 1985), and the Resources-based View (Zollo, 2002). 
Another stream of research focuses on factors that could prevent or bring to stop 
collaborations. Among the factors potentially impeding collaborations, there are the risk 
of adverse selection and moral hazard. The former can arise between a new venture, i.e. 
biotech firm, and its potential alliance partners when there is information asymmetry 
regarding the value of the new venture’s resources and its future prospects (Ozmel et 
al., 2013). According to this, Pisano (1997) suggests that small firms take advantage of 
asymmetric information to out-license their least promising compounds, retaining their 
more promising candidates to develop independently. In order to mitigate these 
problems new ventures can use many different types of signals to reveal their true 
quality to outsiders (Connelly et al, 2011). For instance, Nicholson et al. (2005) state 
that inexperienced biotech companies receive substantially discounted payments when 
forming their first alliance to signal their quality. Ozmel et al. (2013) investigate 
whether and how the effects of different networks are contingent upon one another. In 
particular, they find that both affiliations with venture capitalists (VCs) that have 
prominent positions in syndicate networks and new venture’s prominence in alliance 
network signal biotech firms’ quality and positively influence its likelihood of future 
alliance formation. Moral hazard problems in biopharmaceutical alliances may arise due 
to the fact that pharmaceutical companies are not sure that the funds they are providing 
to their biotechnology partners are not diverted to other research projects (Higgins, 
2007). Contractual design helps to diminish asymmetric information, with the allocation 
of ownership rights firms can divide research tasks and financial resources and control 
the partner’s behaviours. According to this several authors analysed!contractual terms of 
alliances and the allocation of control rights. For instance, Lerner and Merges (1998) 
find that the allocation of control rights to the biotech firm increases with its financial 
resources; while Higgins (2007) underlines that the pharmaceutical companies tend, on 
average, to give up more rights in later stage alliances. 
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Regarding the alliance timing, as underlined by Katila & Mang (2003), there is a lot of 
variation at what stage of the drug R&D process alliance are signed. Arnold et al. 
(2002) suggest that the size of the deals is significantly influenced by alliance time 
therefore the opportunity of signing the agreement is affected by the current stage of the 
R&D process and Niosi (2003) reports that on one hand a too early alliance prevents 
biotech firm from profiting of the real value of his innovation because his new 
compound is underestimated and, on the other hand, if the agreement is signed too late 
the biotech firm could encounter financing problems in the early phases. Hermosilla & 
Qian (2013) underline how biotech managers have to decide the optimal stage in which 
license the compound considering both the R&D process risks and the higher 
attractiveness of licensing contracts terms in case the potential drug is closer to the 
market  
However, scholars who have studied alliance timing don’t come to the same 
conclusions. On one hand, Kalamas et al. (2001) carry out a Monte Carlo simulation in 
order to determine the optimal time of licensing, in particular they found that, with 
improved contract terms, early stage agreement could be more valuable for both biotech 
and pharmaceutical companies. Similarly Katila & Mang (2003), through an empirical 
analysis, investigate when companies decide to collaborate in exploiting opportunities. 
They show how R&D intensity, collaboration experience, increase in the intellectual 
property protection and increase in the number of state biotechnology centres are able to 
move up the alliance. On the other hand, Nicholson et al. (2005), examining the 
determinants of deal payments with asymmetric information, suggest that biotech forms 
can reach higher payments conditions in case of late stage agreement. With a different 
perspective, Bianchi et al. (2011), assuming the viewpoint of the pharmaceutical 
company, identify, through a survey, how different organisational modes of the 
agreements are located in the R&D process. For instance, in-licensing and partnership 
with biotech firm to pursue an innovative objective are mainly located in early drug 
stages. On the other hand, out-licensing or alliance to obtain the access to assets for 
commercially exploiting the new drug are more common in the second part of the R&D 
process. This stream of literature offers some insights regarding alliance timing but 
these studies use surveys or empirical approaches therefore the development of an 
analytical model lacks. 
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1.3.1 Research on R&D alliances with a real options perspective 
More recently ROA has been used also to evaluate R&D alliances established between 
firms. Alliances are an ideal field for the application of ROA due to their characteristics 
of uncertainty, flexibility and irreversible costs. Some scholars studied alliance adopting 
a real option perspective and using an empirical approach (e.g. Tong et al., 2008, Reuer 
and Tong, 2010, Santoro and McGill, 2005, Vassolo et al., 2004, Bérard and Perez, 
2013, McCarter et al., 2011). 
However, according to Lukas (2008), there are a small number of papers adopting real 
options modelling approach in this context. Recently, among these works, Savva and 
Scholtes (2014) and Baldi et al. (2015) investigate how to structure a contractual 
agreement taking into account the embedded options between a small and financially 
constrained biotech company and a major pharmaceutical company. 
Specifically, Savva and Scholtes (2014) model an environment where pharmaceutical 
and biotech firms collaborate in new drug R&D and consider three contractual 
arrangements: co-development, licensing, and co-development with opt-out options. In 
particular, they study a setting where the pharmaceutical company has the option to 
terminate the R&D project and, at the same time, is also the actor making decisions on 
the contractual terms (e.g., milestones and royalties). In co-development the small firm 
runs a risk of running out of capital as future costs rise, while licensing for milestone 
and royalty payments, which eliminates the latter risk, introduces inefficiency as 
profitable projects might be abandoned. Conversely, an option clause in a co-
development contract gives the small firm the right but not the obligation to opt out of 
co-development and into a pre-agreed licensing arrangement avoiding the problems 
associated with both co-development or licensing. Baldi et al. (2015) examine how 
perspectives and negotiation practices between licensor and licensee of IP change under 
uncertainty with a real options perspective. The authors highlight the importance to use 
the real option logic methodology to value three licensing situations for IP managers in 
the context of an illustrative case study involving a French biotech firm, and compare 
them to conventional NPV analysis. They show how management practices change 
depending on who pays for the development costs, controls the 
continuation/development or abandonment option and thereby appropriates more of the 
embedded option’s value.  
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Other papers analyse the effect of uncertainty and flexibility on joint venture duration 
and terminations strategies (Chi, 2000; Lukas, 2008). Specifically, Chi (2000) develops 
a model that is used specifically to examine the option to acquire or divest a joint 
venture, both in the case where the acquisition/divestiture price is specified ex ante in 
the initial contract and in the case where the price is to be negotiated ex post. The 
results derived from the model show how the value of the option and each partner’s 
payoff from the venture vary with the structure of the option. Lukas (2008) adopts a 
real-option-based framework to model a joint venture-induced market entry under both 
economic and technology uncertainty in a continuous time setting. He determines 
critical thresholds for timing and termination strategy in the domain of joint ventures 
and finds that technology uncertainty promotes the formation of joint ventures. 
Also the alliance timing has been investigated by Rogers et al. (2005) and Cvitanić et al. 
(2011). Starting from the above described model of Rogers et al. (2002), Rogers et al. 
(2005) proposed an approach by which to select the best licensing strategy for each 
product in a R&D portfolio. Specifically, in the OptFolio model alliance opportunities 
are considered as real options ad the model is based on the binomial tree method. 
Despite being close to reality, the implementation and use of OptFolio turns out to be 
very complex and difficult to manage. Authors suggest that early licensing agreements 
should be considered to generate the maximum value for pharmaceutical company’s 
projects portfolio. 
Cvitanić et al. (2011) analytically derive the optimal timing and the relative profits 
shares of a pharmaceutical company and a biotech firm involved in a co-development 
alliance. They develop a real options model under three different contract designs. In 
particular, they consider the case of risk sharing between the two firms, the case of 
agreeing on the time to enter, and the case of asymmetric contract decisions. In the latter 
case authors assume that the biotech firm decides on the initiation time, while the 
pharmaceutical company decides on how to share the profits. If the firms are risk-
neutral the three contract designs are equivalent. However, for risk adverse firms, the 
three contract designs may differ significantly in the optimal contract parameters, but 
not much in the time of entry or in the level of expected utility. 
While Rogers et al. (2005) take only the perspective of the pharmaceutical company, 
Cvitanić et al. (2011) consider the contract design for sharing the profits for both 
! 45!
alliance partners. However both studies, even if provide relevant insights on the 
management literature of the alliances, consider only the role of the alliance partners as 
if they act alone in the market. Anyway in the context of the real markets, this 
assumption is not realistic since firms often work in very crowded markets and the 
presence of strategic interactions with other actors, e.g. competition, can influence their 
choice of the most profitable investment strategies. 
1.4 Research goal 
The above sections provided a general overview of three prominent streams of research: 
real options methodology, real options games and R&D alliance in the 
biopharmaceutical industry with a real option perspective. Describing the major 
contributions of the scholars I have identified some aspects that have not been 
sufficiently addressed in previous studies. 
Alliances in the pharmaceutical industry represent the new business model to respond to 
the significant modifications in the competitive environment (Bianchi et al., 2011). One 
of the main decisions that both pharmaceutical and biotech companies face is whether 
and when to ally. Although literature on alliance is wide, in the field of alliance timing 
much remains to study. Specifically, the conclusions to which arrive the scholars are not 
definitive. In addition, to the best of my knowledge, no studies have considered the 
strategic interactions with other firms in alliance timing decisions. This topic is 
particularly relevant as biotechnology industry is characterised by the presence of many 
competitors (FierceBiotech, 2007). In doing so it is necessary to take into account the 
multi-staged, costly and risky nature of the R&D process, the market uncertainty as well 
as the flexibility of managers. As suggested by Villiger and Bogdan (2005), in this field 
ROA should be adopted. However, the development of an analytical model to 
understand firms’ behaviours, that take into account both aspects, is not present on 
previous works. 
Therefore, the research goal of this thesis is to investigate the optimal timing in making 
an R&D alliance in a competitive environment taking both perspectives to incorporate 
the active role of both pharmaceutical and biotech firms. Principal aspects I would 
consider are competitiveness and uncertainty that characterize the market. To take into 
account both aspects I adopt the real options game approach. Differently from the 
previous literature I develop a model focusing on the choice of the alliance timing rather 
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than investment timing. I would also investigate the importance of adopting the real 
options perspective to evaluate alliance timing decisions instead of the traditional NPV 
methodology, showing how firms’ optimal strategies are affected by the methodology 
utilised. 
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Chapter 2 
Optimal timing for the biotech firms in a ROG model 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I develop a model to study alliance timing in presence of competition 
among biotech firms. Specifically, taking the perspective of biotech firms facing the 
decision of whether and when to collaborate with a pharmaceutical company, I 
investigate how the presence of competition might change firms’ optimal strategies 
about the timing and the profitability of signing the alliance. To take into account both 
uncertainty of the R&D process and the presence of competition,! I! adopt the Real 
Options Games approach. In general, alliance timing decisions are the result of a trade-
off. In fact, taking the viewpoint of a biotech firm, an early arrangement entails a risk 
sharing opportunity and the biotech firm can conduct higher quality and more 
successful R&D activities thanks to the considerable amount of financial resources 
coming from the pharmaceutical company (Gassmann and Reepmeyer, 2005). At the 
same time, however, an early arrangement has the negative effect of giving even higher 
bargaining power to the pharmaceutical company in determining the payment amount, 
which might financially penalise the biotech firm. On the contrary, in spite of higher 
risks of failure in early stages, a later agreement might help the biotech firm to better 
monetise from the innovation through higher payment conditions and higher royalties in 
the final market (Nicholson et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 2005). In general, the dominance 
of one of these contrasting forces over the other one determines whether a biotech 
should collaborate in early stages or postpone such a decision as late as possible. The 
existence of such conflicting forces also helps explain why is possible to observe 
substantial differences in the timing of real alliances. As a matter of fact, among the top 
biotech licensing deals in 2012, it is possible to observe a very large heterogeneity in 
alliance timing (Carroll, 2012). For instance, the agreements between FivePrime 
Therapeutics and GlaxoSmithKline and between Genmab and Novartis relate to the 
discovery stage in the new drug development process. On the other hand, the agreement 
between Enanta and Novartis relates to preclinical phase, whereas the agreement 
between Galapagos NV and Abbott Laboratories focuses on phase II. Some other 
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agreements, such as that between Thrombogenics and Merck KGaA, concern the stage 
of application for approval. 
As reported in chapter 1, while previous studies offer important intuitions about alliance 
timing in the absence of competition among biotech firms, no works, to the best of my 
knowledge, are available when biotech firms compete in the same market. However, 
biotechnology industry is characterised by the presence of many competitors 
(FierceBiotech, 2007). Particularly, a Deloitte survey reports that a solid majority of 
both large and small companies in this industry believes that the alliance market will 
become even more competitive (Deloitte, 2005). In fact, naturally, some competitors 
end up working in the same therapeutic area. As an example, recent industry voices 
anticipate the emergence of a “horse race” in the migraine treatments among a number 
of biotech firms (Schatzman, 2013). Therefore, it is more realistic to incorporate the 
possible reaction of competitors in the decision-making process.  
Specifically, I consider two competing biotech firms that have to decide whether and 
when to partner with a pharmaceutical company. The collaboration is in the form of in-
licensing, an inbound solution, that typically, in its more general terms, involves up-
front payments, milestones payments based on the successful completion of an R&D 
stage and royalty payments upon product commercialisation (Rogers et al., 2005; 
Dahlander and Gann, 2010). In the model, the alliance is mutually exclusive in the 
sense that the pharmaceutical company will only contract with one biotech firm. This is 
consistent with the observation that usually pharmaceutical companies identify and 
make a selection only among the most promising biotech target firms (Kalamas et al., 
2001). I assume that both biotech firms can reach the market individually, which 
implies that they are not exactly researching on the same molecule. Therefore, if one 
biotech firm signs an alliance with the pharmaceutical company, the other can only 
continue the R&D process individually with some spillover benefits from the 
competitor’s alliance, but with her own (limited) financial resources. This scenario is 
quite reasonable in reality and offers an opportunity to investigate alliance timing 
decisions from a wider perspective (Rogers et al., 2005). 
In fact, in such case, competition might change the previous considerations about the 
timing and the profitability of signing the alliance. Intuitively, one could think that the 
introduction of competition will raise the incentive of each biotech firm to anticipate the 
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timing of collaboration with the pharmaceutical company in order to prevent the 
opponent from being faster in establishing the alliance. Therefore, the incentive to 
anticipate might be due to the traditional economics of pre-emption. To some extent, 
this might be the case of the recent alliance of Forma Therapeutics with Celgene. In 
fact, the small biotech firm has reached the deal right after several other biotech firms, 
such as Cleave Biosciences and Proteostasis Therapeutics, entered the field of protein 
homeostasis (McBride, 2013). However, an opposite effect might arise as well. In fact, 
there might be a strong competitive pressure to reach later stages or, even, the final 
market with products whose revenue are not shared with the pharmaceutical company in 
order to appropriate higher profits and win the competition against the rival. This effect 
seems to be consistent with several examples of successful biotech firms more and more 
willing to postpone potential deals in such a competitive arena (Toonkel, 2013).  
By way of anticipation, my findings suggest that whether, when and who will ally with 
the pharmaceutical company depend on the contract terms offered by the 
pharmaceutical company, the market value increase due to the presence of the 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as the competitive advantage one biotech firm gains 
against the competitor due to the alliance. Identifying and understanding the conditions 
under which specific results arise can be particularly useful to both biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies involved in open-innovation based R&D project decisions in 
a competitive environment. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I introduce the 
ROG model in case of only one biotech firm is active in the market. In particular, I 
present biotech firms’ payoff expressions and the game solution. In the following 
section, I extend the model and relative solutions in the duopoly case. Later a discussion 
of results is provided. In the final section, conclusions are drawn. 
2.2 The monopoly case 
To better understand how the model works and how the presence of competition could 
affect alliance timing decisions, first of all, I present the simpler model of monopoly 
case. When there is only one firm in the market, it is possible to design the game as a 
game against nature, in which the player should optimise its payoff facing the stochastic 
fluctuations in project value (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2007). 
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I assume there is only one biotech firm in the market that has the possibility to establish 
a partnership with a pharmaceutical company that has the bargaining power to offer a 
take-it-or-leave-it contract and I maintain this assumption throughout the chapter. I 
consider two generic stages that model the staging of R&D investments in two phases: 
an investigative and confirmatory phase (first stage or stage I) and a manufacturing and 
commercialization one (second stage or stage II). At the beginning of the game, the 
pharmaceutical company offers the opportunity to the biotech firm to sign the 
agreement, and she has two possibilities: “Sign the alliance” or “Not sign the alliance”. 
In case of alliance, biotech firm will receive an upfront payment (Pf) at the beginning of 
the stage and a certain amount of royalties upon product commercialization (1−α f ) . If 
biotech firm rejects the agreement in the first stage, in the second stage the game is 
repeated. Also in this stage the contract offered to the biotech firm consists of an 
upfront payment (Ps) at the beginning of the current stage and an amount of royalties 
upon product commercialization (1−α s ) . 
Figure 6 depicts the extensive form of the game, biotech firm’s payoffs are defined as 
 
π j
B  where j = f (first), s (second) stands for the stage in which the agreement is signed. 
The derivation of the biotech firms’ payoff expressions will be described in the 
following sub-section. 
 
!
Figure 6: Game structure in monopoly case. 
The collaboration between the pharmaceutical company and the biotech firm produces 
synergies between the two actors that increase the total size of the potential market of 
BIO 
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B(t1)
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B(t1)
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the drug. Indeed, the pharmaceutical company, thanks to his advanced manufacturing 
and marketing capabilities, is able to amplify the value of the drug and this can be 
modelled by an amplification factor, denoted as δ (>1) (Rogers et al., 2005). 
2.2.1 Model assumption and biotech firm’s payoff expressions in monopoly case 
In general, in the real world, pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms sign alliances 
along all the R&D process. For the sake of simplicity, I consider only two phases: the 
first phase (i.e., stage I) starts at t0 and corresponds to exploratory clinical trials and 
confirmatory clinical trials (Girotra et al., 2007), at t1 the second phase starts (stage II), 
i.e. manufacturing and commercialization phases. In the model, the expected market 
value of the drug, denoted as V, is based on the NPV of all expected cash flows 
following the end of the game. 
According to the option perspective, during the interval (t0, t1), the expected market 
value of the candidate drug changes over time and it is represented by a non-negative 
random process V(t). Specifically, at t1 the value V(t1) is the expected market value of 
the fully approved drug. At any time t < t1, V(t) is a forecast of this market value and is 
updated as new information arrives. Indeed, the market value of the candidate drug 
changes due to several factors such as, changing disease demographics, epidemics, 
changes in the competitive landscape (such as entries or failures of competing drug 
candidates) but also as a consequence of the revealed safety and efficacy characteristics 
of the drug (Savva and Scholtes, 2014). In particular, the value of the project follows a 
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), 3  with drift parameter µ > 0 and volatility 
parameter σ >0 and its probability density function is a lognormal one. As soon as the 
maturity is reached at t1, i.e. at the beginning of the second stage, the drug value is a 
known realization of this process, due to the fact that the biotechnology firm has more 
information about the value of cash flows coming from the commercialization. 4 
Moreover, for the sake of modelling convenience, I make the risk-neutrality assumption 
for the firm. Under these assumptions, in the first stage it is possible to adopt the Black 
and Scholes approach to evaluate biotech firm’s first stage payoff expression, which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 This is consistent with the previous literature on investment under uncertainty (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994) described above in Chapter 1. 
4 There is more information, but never, complete certainty about future cash flows of the project 
(Dixit and Pyndyck, 1994). 
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ensures the flexibility offered by the option to decide further investments when more 
information is available. Indeed, the investment in the first stage represents the price to 
buy the option to continue the development in the second stage. At the beginning of the 
second stage, uncertainty is reduced and the realization of the underlying is known, 
therefore I use the simple NPV methodology to evaluate biotech firm’s second stage 
payoff expression.5 
Before computing biotech firm’s payoff expressions, I define the following parameters 
where subscript f stands for first stage and s stands for second stage: 
• If = drug research and development investment cost incurred by the biotech firm 
in the first stage; 
• Is = drug research and development investment cost incurred by the biotech firm 
in the second stage;  
• Vs = V(t1), i.e. expected net cash flows arising after commercialization calculated 
at the beginning of the second stage; 
• Vf = V(t0), i.e. present value of Vs calculated at the beginning of the first stage; 
• Pf = upfront payment offered, in case of alliance, by the pharmaceutical 
company to the biotech firm at the beginning of the first stage;  
• Ps = upfront payment offered, in case of alliance, by the pharmaceutical 
company to the biotech firm at the beginning of the second stage; 
• (1−α f )= percentage of royalties that biotech firm receives in case of alliance in 
the first stage; 
• (1−α s )= percentage of royalties that biotech firm receives in case of alliance in 
the second stage. 
Table 3 shows biotech firm’s second stage payoff expressions, i.e. the payoff 
expressions when the alliance is signed in the second stage or no alliance is signed, 
calculated with the NPV methodology at t1. Note that I restrict the analysis to a region 
of parameters that ensures positive payoffs. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Moreover, the R&D process does not need further investments and, as a consequence, no more 
options are available. 
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Table 3: Biotech firm’s second stage payoff expression. 
Scenario Biotech firm’s payoff  
Alliance at stage 
II  
π s
B(t1)  (1−α s )δVs + Ps (t1)− Is  
No alliance  π
B(t1)  Vs − Is  
 
Concerning first stage payoff expressions, i.e. the payoff expressions when the alliance 
is signed in the first stage, and the second stage payoff expressions backtracked to time 
t0, as stated before, I use the Black and Scholes formula to take into account the 
stochastic evolution of the drug market value.6 Payoff expressions are represented by 
the difference between an European call option, 
 
C j
B  (where j = f, s stands for the stage 
in which the agreement is signed) and the investment needed in the first stage, If. In case 
of alliance in the first stage the biotech firm will also receives the upfront payment, Pf. 
In Table 4 I report the first stage payoff expressions and the second stage payoff 
expressions backtracked to time t0, specifying underlying values and exercise prices. 
Note that both If and Pf are sunk costs that do not affect the option value; the exercise 
price is equivalent to the investment required at the second stage. In case of alliance in 
the second stage, underlying value increases by an amount equal to the expected 
payment  Ps  of the second stage discounted at t0.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For the sake of clarity below the Black and Scholes formula (Black and Scholes, 1973) is 
reported: 
 
C = SN (d1)− e
−rτ XN (d2 )
d1 =
ln(S X )+ (r +σ 2 2)τ
σ τ
d2 = d1 −σ τ  
where S is the underlying value, X is the exercise price, τ is the time to maturity, r is the risk-
free interest rate and σ is the volatility of V(t). N represents the cumulative standard normal 
distribution function. 
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Table 4: Biotech firm’s first stage payoff expression and second stage payoff expressions 
backtracked to time t0. 
Scenario Biotech firm’s payoff Underlying value 
Exercise 
price 
Alliance 
at stage II  
π s
B(t0 )   max(Cs
B − I f ;0)  (1−α s )δVf + Pse
−rt   Is  
Alliance 
at stage I  
π f
B(t0 )   max(C f
B + Pf − I f ;0)  (1−α f )δVf   Is  
No 
alliance  
π B(t0 )   max(C
B − I f ;0)  Vf   Is  
 
2.2.2 Game solution 
In the game, three different scenarios of equilibrium are possible: the biotech firm allies 
in the first stage, the biotech firm allies in the second stage and no alliance is signed. To 
obtain the equilibrium the game is solved via backward induction. 
Therefore, starting from the second stage I resolve the first sub-game (see Figure 7) 
comparing  π s
B(t1)  (i.e., the second stage alliance payoff expression) and  π
B(t1)  (i.e., the 
no alliance payoff expression) to evaluate the level of Ps  that makes the two profits 
equal. 
 
Figure 7: Second stage sub-game in monopoly case. 
The minimum value of the expected Ps , which makes the biotech firm indifferent 
between alliance and no-alliance, is given by the following expression: 
BIO 
 π s
B(t1)
 π
B(t1)
ALLIANCE 
II STAGE 
NO ALLIANCE 
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Ps = (1− (1−α s )δ )Vs          (26) 
Note that this payment is a linear function of the value of the project Vs. Particularly, at 
the beginning of the second stage the value of the project Vs, is log-normally distributed 
with expected value, E Vs[ ] , equal to Vf ert . 
For values of Ps  greater than this threshold (equation 26), the equilibrium of the second 
stage sub-game is “Alliance”, and for lower values the vice versa holds. 
Moving back to the first stage, I find the equilibrium of the game comparing 
 
π f
B(t0 )  (i.e., 
first stage alliance payoff expression) with each possible scenarios of equilibrium found 
in the first sub-game, i.e. first with  π s
B(t0 )  and then with  π
B(t0 )  (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8: First stage sub-game in monopoly case. 
As stated above, backtracking to t0, as V(t) is log-normally distributed, I consider the 
present value of Vs, i.e. Vf, and payoffs are computed as call options. Note that also the 
second stage payment is discounted and it is an expected value,  Ps(t0 ) , calculated at t0. 
It is given by the following expression: 
Ps (t0 ) = Pse−rt = (1− (1−α s )δ )Vf ert( )e−rt = (1− (1−α s )δ )Vf     (27) 
In the first stage sub-game, I find the Pf thresholds that make the biotech firm 
indifferent between the two alternatives. First I assume that the equilibrium of the 
second stage is “Alliance”, therefore I compare 
 
π f
B(t0 )  (i.e., first stage alliance payoff 
expression) with  π s
B(t0 )  (i.e., second stage alliance payoff expression backtracked to t0) 
and the minimum value of Pf that makes the biotech firm indifferent between the two 
alternatives is given by the following expression: 
BIO 
 
π f
B(t0 )ALLIANCE I STAGE 
EQUILIBRIUM 
II STAGE  π
B(t0 ) π s
B(t0 ) OR 
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 Pf = Cs
B −C f
B           (28) 
If Pf is greater than this threshold the equilibrium of the game will be “Alliance in the 
first stage”, otherwise it will be “Alliance in the second stage”. Conversely, assuming 
that the equilibrium in the second stage is “No alliance”, in the first stage I compare 
 
π f
B(t0 )  (i.e., first stage alliance payoff expression) with  π
B(t0 )  (i.e., no alliance payoff 
expression backtracked to t0) and the minimum value of Pf is given by the following 
expression: 
 Pf = C
B −C f
B           (29) 
Indeed for values of Pf greater than this threshold the equilibrium of the game will be 
“Alliance in the first stage”, otherwise it will be “No alliance”. 
In Table 5 the payments thresholds (Pf and Ps) for the monopoly game and the 
corresponding scenarios of equilibrium are reported. 
Table 5: Threshold payments (Pf and Ps) and possible scenarios of equilibrium in the monopoly 
case. 
 
Pf 
Low High 
Ps 
Ps < (1− (1−α s )δ )Vs  Low  
Pf < C
B −C f
B   Pf > C
B −C f
B  
No alliance Alliance I Stage 
Ps > (1− (1−α s )δ )Vs  High  
Pf < Cs
B −C f
B   Pf > Cs
B −C f
B  
Alliance II Stage Alliance I Stage 
 
Specifically, the results suggest that, if the pharmaceutical company does not offer a 
considerable amount of payment in the initial stage, i.e., Ps is low, the biotech firm 
might find more profitable waiting until the second stage to possibly obtain better 
payment conditions. In the second stage, in fact, the biotech firm will ally with the 
pharmaceutical company only under favourable payment conditions, i.e., high values of 
Ps. Otherwise, the biotech firm will prefer to continue the R&D process on her own. 
However, if in the first stage the payment conditions are sufficiently high, the biotech 
company will sign an early alliance independently of any value of Ps. 
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2.3 The duopoly case 
In presence of competition in the market, firms know that their investment decisions 
could determine competitive reactions that would in turn impact the value of their own 
investment opportunity. In this case the investment decision analysis can be defined as a 
strategic games against competition (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2007). 
Specifically, concerning my model, I suppose that exists another biotech firm that has 
the possibility to partner with the same pharmaceutical company. Thus, each biotech 
firm must be aware that she could be anticipated by the rival in case she decides to 
postpone the hypothetical alliance to the second stage. Therefore, my objective is to 
determine how competition could affect biotech firms’ optimal strategy. In particular I 
derive the conditions under each biotech competitor should anticipate, postpone or 
disregard the opportunity of collaboration. 
I model a Stackelberg game where there are two identical players, namely B1 and B2, 
that play sequentially with perfect and complete information, and two stages, that are 
the same as before. I suppose that B1 is the first mover, i.e. she enjoys a first mover 
advantage, and the alliance is mutually exclusive, i.e. the pharmaceutical company will 
only contract with one biotech firm. If one biotech firm signs an agreement with the 
pharmaceutical company, the lonely player continues the R&D process and reach the 
market on its own (FierceBiotech, 2015). This assumption implies that biotech firms are 
not exactly researching on the same molecule. The sequence of the game is as follows. 
At the beginning of stage 1, B1 is selected by the pharmaceutical company, which 
offers, as before, a contract consisting of Pf and (1−α f ) . If B1 rejects the offer, the 
same contract is offered to B2 that can accept or reject the offer too. If no agreement has 
been reached in the first stage, in the second stage the game is repeated and the contract 
consists of Ps and (1−α s ) . Note that the contract offered by the pharmaceutical 
company differs between the two stages but it is the same for both biotech firms due to 
the assumption of a symmetric environment.7 
In case none of the biotech firms signs the agreement with the pharmaceutical company, 
they are able to reach the final market individually and they share the total market !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Also the investments required for the R&D process prosecution are the same for both biotech 
firms. 
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according to a parameter γ  for B1 and (1−γ )  for B2. In case of alliance in any of the 
two stages, similar to the monopoly case, the partnership inflates the market according 
to δ (>1). Furthermore, the alliance generates spillover effects, i.e. not only the biotech 
firm signing the alliance, but also the “lonely” competitor receives benefit from the 
rival’s collaboration and enjoys the larger market. The presence of R&D spillover 
effects is significant among different sectors as discussed in Bernstein and Mohnen 
(1998). Henderson and Cockburn (1996) documented the importance of spillover 
effects in biotechnology industry. In particular, Berndt et al. (1995) also suggested the 
presence of marketing spillover in the pharmaceutical industry. 
However, the total market pie will be split differently between the two biotech firms. 
Specifically, the biotech firm signing the alliance will appropriate a higher portion, β
(β > γ ) , while the “stand-alone” competitor will appropriate of the remaining portion 
(1− β ) .  
Figure 9 shows the game structure, the first stage starts at t0 and the second one at t1; 
biotech firms’ payoff expressions are denoted as 
 
π j,Bi
Bk , where j = f (first), s (second) 
stands for the stage in which the agreement is signed, Bi = B1, B2 represents the biotech 
firm that signs the agreement and Bk = B1, B2 the biotech firm to which the payoff is 
referred. In case no alliance is signed the subscript (j, Bi) is eliminated.  
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Figure 9: Game structure in duopoly case. 
2.3.1 Biotech firms’ payoff expressions in duopoly case 
Regarding firms’ payoff expressions, they are computed similarly to the monopoly case. 
In particular at t=t0, uncertainty about the value of the project is partially resolved as a 
result of improved information about several factors influencing the market value of the 
candidate drug. The residual uncertainty is about future cash flows; their expected 
value, i.e. Vs, is known and, therefore, the simple NPV methodology to compute firms’ 
payoff expressions can be adopted. Table 6 shows the biotech firms’ second stage 
payoff expressions, 
 π s,Bi
Bk (t1) , under the three possible scenarios, namely, the alliance is 
formed with B1, the alliance is formed with B2, and no alliance is formed. 
Table 6: Biotech firms’ second stage payoff expressions. 
Scenario 
Payoff B1 Payoff B2 
 π s,Bi
B1 (t1)   π s,Bi
B2 (t1)  
B1 signs the 
alliance at stage 
II 
(1−α s )βδVs + Ps − Is  (1− β )δVs − Is  
B2 signs the 
alliance at stage 
(1− β )δVs − Is  (1−α s )βδVs + Ps − Is  
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II 
No alliance γVs − Is  (1−γ )Vs − Is  
 
In the interest of length, I provide just an example to illustrate how to obtain the present 
value of second stage payoff expressions (i.e., at time t0) starting from those computed 
in Table 6. Specifically, I consider the case where B1 signs the alliance with the 
pharmaceutical company in the second stage. Backtracking to time t0, the present values 
of the second stage payoff expressions for both biotech firms are respectively8: 
E π s,B1B1 (t1)( ) = E (1−α s )βδVs + Ps ((1−α s )βδVs + Ps ) > Is⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Pr ((1−α s )βδVs + Ps ) > Is[ ]−
−Is Pr ((1−α s )βδVs + Ps ) > Is[ ]
  (30) 
E π s,B1B2 (t1)( ) = E (1− β )δVs (1− β )δVs > Is⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Pr (1− β )δVs > Is[ ]− Is Pr (1− β )δVs > Is[ ]  (31) 
As a matter of fact, B1 and B2 will only continue with the development of the drug if 
their expected payoffs are positive, i.e., only if E ((1−α s )βδVs + Ps ) > Is[ ] and 
E (1− β )δVs > Is[ ]  hold, respectively. Given that the value of the project over time V(t) is 
uncertain and follows a GBM, as before, I model the present value of second stage 
payoffs at t0 using ROA by adopting the Black and Scholes formula. Therefore, it is 
straightforward to recognize that both equation (30) and equation (31) are two simple 
call options with the underlying values respectively equal to (1−α s )βδVf + Ps (t0 )  and 
(1− β )δVf  and the exercise price equal to Is. I define them  C f ,B1
B1  and 
 
C f ,B1
B2 , respectively 
(see Table 7). In general, 
 
C j,Bi
Bk  is the biotech call option where Bk, j and Bi have the 
same meaning as before. In case no alliance is signed the subscript (j, Bi) is eliminated. 
In Table 7 I report the underlying values of the biotech call options for all scenarios.9 !
Therefore, biotech firms’ second stage payoff expressions at t0 net of the first stage 
investment cost If are: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Readers can refer to D. M. Chance (2014) for an exhaustive understanding of this approach. 
9 It is important to note that all the call options have the same exercise price equal to Is. 
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π s,B1
B1 (t0 ) = Cs,B1
B1 − I f          (32) 
 
π s,B1
B2 (t0 ) = Cs,B1
B2 − I f          (33) 
Also in case the alliance is signed in the first stage, I compute biotech firms’ first stage 
payoff expressions using the Black and Scholes formula. For instance, in case B1 allies 
with the pharmaceutical company, biotech firms’ first stage payoff expressions are 
equal to: 
 
π f ,B1
B1 (t0 ) = C f ,B1
B1 − I f + Pf ,B1         (34) 
 
π f ,B1
B2 (t0 ) = C f ,B1
B2 − I f          (35) 
where If is the investment both biotech firms make in the first stage and  Pf ,B1  is the 
upfront payment B1 receives in the first stage. 
Table 7: Underlying values of the call options, 
 
C j,Bi
Bk . 
Scenario 
Call 
options 
B1’s 
Underlying Values 
B2’s 
Underlying Values 
B1 signs the 
alliance at stage I  
C f ,B1
Bi
 
(1−α f )βδVf  (1− β )δVf  
B2 signs the 
alliance at stage I  
C f ,B2
Bi
 
(1− β )δVf  (1−α f )βδVf  
B1 signs the 
alliance at stage II  
Cs,B1
Bi
 
(1−α s )βδVf + Ps (t0 )  (1− β )δVf  
B2 signs the 
alliance at stage II  
Cs,B2
Bi
 
(1− β )δVf  (1−α s )βδVf + Ps (t0 )  
No alliance  C
Bi
 
γVf  (1−γ )Vf  
 
In Table 8 I report first stage payoff expressions and second stage payoff expressions 
backtracked to time t0 for both biotech firms. 
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Table 8: ROA biotech firms’ first stage payoff expressions and second stage payoff expressions 
backtracked to time t0. 
Scenario 
B1’s Payoff  B2’s Payoff 
 π j ,Bi
B1 (t0 )   π j ,Bi
B2 (t0 )  
B1 signs the 
alliance at stage I  
max(C f ,B1
B1 − I f + Pf ;0)   
max(C f ,B1
B2 − I f ;0)  
B2 signs the 
alliance at stage I  
max(C f ,B2
B1 − I f ;0)   
max(C f ,B2
B2 − I f + Pf ;0)
 
B1 signs the 
alliance at stage 
II 
 max(Cs,B1
B1 − I f ;0)   max(Cs,B1
B2 − I f ;0)  
B2 signs the 
alliance at stage 
II 
 
max(Cs,B2
B1 − I f ;0)   
max(Cs,B2
B2 − I f ;0)  
No alliance  
max(C B1 − I f ;0)   
max(C B2 − I f ;0)  
 
The reader can note that in case of alliance, the biotech firm that signs the agreement 
have to share her market share, β , with the pharmaceutical company and receives 
(1−α j )  of royalties; whereas the “lonely” biotech takes all her market share (1− β ) . In 
contrast, the biotech involved in the alliance receives the upfront payment, which brings 
to her financial support, while the other player takes on all the R&D costs. As β  
increases, the alliance market share increases as well. 
2.3.2 Game solution 
Also in the duopoly case the game is solved through the backward induction. In this 
case, I analyse firms’ decisions starting from B2 and then I go back to B1’s decision, 
first in the second and then in the first stage. Clearly, B1 enjoys a first mover advantage, 
she can observe B2’s decisions and take them into account. Solving the game entirely, 
five scenarios of equilibrium are possible: B1 allies in the first stage, B1 allies in the 
second stage, B2 allies in the first stage, B2 allies in the second stage, none of the 
biotech firms allies. Similarly as the monopoly case, I derive upfront payment 
thresholds for all the possible paths of the game. I obtain different scenarios of 
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equilibrium solutions depending on the value of δ. Thus, I distinguish between two 
main cases: high synergies case with δ > (1−γ ) / (1− β )  and low synergies case with 
δ < (1−γ ) / (1− β ) . Table 9 and Table 10 summarise the possible alliance outcomes in 
high synergies case and low synergies case, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, in 
the threshold values I reported the call options, 
 
C j,Bi
B1 , referred to B1. The same 
condition holds for BIO2: the reader can verify the correspondence with 
 
C j,Bi
B2  using 
Table 7. 
! 64!
Table 9: Threshold payments (Pf and Ps) and possible scenarios of equilibrium in the duopoly case and high synergies (NA stands for not admitted). 
δ > (1−γ ) / (1− β )  Pf 
Low Medium High 
Ps 
Ps < (γ − (1−α s )βδ )Vs  Low  
Pf < C
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
 
C B1 −C f ,B1
B1 < Pf < C f ,B2
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
 
Pf > C f ,B2
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
No alliance B2 I Stage B1 I Stage 
(γ − (1−α s )βδ )Vs < Ps < (1− β )δVs − (1−α s )βδVs  Medium  
Pf < Cs,B2
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
 
Cs,B2
B1 −C f ,B1
B1 < Pf < C f ,B2
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
 
Pf > C f ,B2
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
B2 II Stage B2 I Stage B1 I Stage 
Ps > (1− β )δVs − (1−α s )βδV  High  
Pf < Cs,B1
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
NA  
Pf > Cs,B1
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
B1 II Stage B1 I Stage 
 
Table 10: Threshold payments (Pf and Ps) and possible scenarios of equilibrium in the duopoly case and low synergies. 
δ < (1−γ ) / (1− β )  Pf 
Low High 
Ps 
Ps < (γ − (1−α s )βδ )Vs  Low  
Pf < C
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
 
Pf > C
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
No alliance B1 I Stage 
Ps > (γ − (1−α s )βδ )Vs  High  
Pf < Cs,B1
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
 
Pf > Cs,B1
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  
B1 II Stage B1 I Stage 
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Starting from the high synergies case, the reader can observe that, depending on the 
values of Pf and Ps, all the five scenarios of equilibrium are possible. In particular, the 
first mover might find more profitable that the other player partners with the 
pharmaceutical company to enjoy generous spillover effects. Specifically, this occurs 
when both first and second stage payments are intermediate or when one of them is low 
and the other is intermediate. Interestingly, if the first stage payments are intermediate 
the alliance will be established in the first stage. Alternatively, in the presence of 
intermediate second stage payments and low first stage payments, the optimal timing is 
to ally in the second stage. Instead, if, in the first stage, the payment conditions are 
sufficiently high, there is no space for B2 to sign the agreement, as the first mover will 
sign an early alliance independently of any value of Ps. Moreover, the first mover will 
pre-empt the rival partnering with the pharmaceutical company in the second stage also 
when the relative payment is sufficiently high, while the first stage payment is not 
appealing. Finally, if the pharmaceutical company does not offer attractive payment 
conditions in both stages, i.e., Pf and Ps are low, no biotech firm will find optimal to 
sign an agreement with the pharmaceutical company. 
Moving to the low synergies case, there is no possibility for the second mover to partner 
with the pharmaceutical company. Interestingly, in this case, the market outcomes are 
identical to the case of monopoly and similar considerations can be done. The intuition 
behind this result is that the market pie has not been enlarged enough so that B1’s 
competitive advantage of being the first mover more than outweighs the benefits 
derived from the spillover effect. As a result, the alliance “window” is closed to B2. 
2.4 Discussion of results 
To better visualise the obtained results and provide a practical application of the relative 
insights, I complement the analytical derivation with a numerical analysis for both 
monopoly and duopoly case. The numerical analysis relies on a case study available in 
the literature, which considers a drug in the third clinical phase (Rogers et al., 2002). 
Specifically, I consider the following set of parameters: Vf = $400M, σ = 30%, r = 5%, 
If = $75M, Is = $180M, γ = 0,5. The numerical analysis allows to understand how δ 
combines with the payment conditions and affects firms’ alliance timing decisions. 
In particular, in the monopoly case, I considered different values of δ (equal to 1.1, 2.2, 
and 2.7 respectively) to include several scenarios of the value added by the 
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pharmaceutical company. For the sake of brevity, I illustrate such influence in case the 
alliance, if any, can only arise in the first stage, i.e., low values of Ps. In this case, 
Figure 10 identifies the region of alliance as a function of Pf and α f . 
 
!
Figure 10: Monopoly thresholds 
 
Pf = C
B −C f
B( )  when Ps is low and δ varies. 
When the total market size increases due to the contribution of the pharmaceutical 
company, the biotech firm has more chances to sign an early agreement with the 
pharmaceutical company in order to take advantage of the high synergies. These results 
are consistent with Rogers et al. (2005), who find that early licensing agreements are 
worthy of consideration as the value added to the developed drug by the partnership 
increases. 
Also in the duopoly case, I analyse how parameters of interest affect biotech firms’ 
alliance timing decisions. In case of high synergies, for the sake of brevity, I report the 
region of alliance as a function of Pf and α f , in the case of low values of Ps, for β equal 
to 0.55, 0.65 and 0.75 respectively. Specifically, Figure 11 shows payments thresholds 
for δ=2.2. When the level of competition increases, i.e. β increases, the alliance region 
for B2 is more and more reduced whereas the early alliance region for B1 is increased. 
Figure 12 shows payments thresholds for δ=2.7. Therefore, it is possible to note that a 
higher value of the amplification factor δ enlarges B2’s alliance zone. 
δ=1,1% δ=2,2%
δ=2,7%
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Figure 11: Duopoly thresholds 
 
Pf = C f ,B2
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  if Pf  is high and Pf < C
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  if Pf  is low( )  
in case of high synergy when Ps is low, δ = 2.2 and β varies. 
!
!
Figure 12: Duopoly thresholds 
 
Pf = C f ,B2
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  if Pf  is high and Pf < C
B1 −C f ,B1
B1  if Pf  is low( )  
in case of high synergy when Ps is low, δ = 2.7 and β varies. 
In case of low synergies, I report the region of alliance as a function of Pf and α f , in the 
case of low values of Ps, for δ=1.1, β equal to 0.55, 0.65 and 0.75 respectively. Figure 
β=0,55% β=0,65%
β=0,75%
β=0,75%
β=0,65%β=0,55%
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13 shows how a higher level of β determines an increase of the region of B1’s first stage 
alliance. 
 
!
Figure 13: Duopoly thresholds 
 
Pf = C
B1 −C f ,B1
B1( )  in case of low synergy when Ps is low, δ = 
1.1 and β varies. 
Furthermore, by comparing monopoly case (Figure 10) and low synergies case (Figure 
13), it can be observed that competition leads to lower threshold payments than the 
monopoly structure. In fact, as the level of competition increases, lower payments are 
required by the first mover to ally. This result can be demonstrated by comparing the 
conditions Pf (in monopoly case) > C
B −C f
B  and 
 
Pf (in duopoly case) < C
B1 −C f ,B1
B1 .  
As the call options have the same exercise price, I can simply compare their underlying 
values, which are Vf − (1−α f )δVf  in case of monopoly and Vf − (1−α f )βδVf  in case of 
duopoly, respectively. Comparison yields that payments are lower in case of 
competition if the condition δ < (1−γ ) / (1− β )  holds. It is straightforward to prove that 
such condition is always satisfied given that the case of low synergy is considered. 
A final important remark is that the ROA offers more opportunities to the biotech firms 
to ally if compared to the traditional use of the NPV because only positive values of 
future opportunities are considered. In fact, the region where alliance arises is larger 
when the ROA approach is utilised. Figure 14 shortly summarises this implication of 
β=0,75%
β=0,65%β=0,55%
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ROA flexibility. A more detailed analysis on the differences between the two 
methodologies will be reported in chapter 3. 
 
!
Figure 14: Pf thresholds (the same of Figure 13) evaluated with both NPV and ROA in case of 
low synergy when Ps is low, δ = 1.1 and β varies. 
2.5 Conclusion 
My results suggest that under a Stackelberg game, where one biotech firm is the first 
mover, whereas the other is the follower, whether and when to ally with the 
pharmaceutical company depend on the contract terms (i.e. payments and royalties), 
level of competition and synergies coming from the alliance. Specifically, there are 
numerous interesting cases. In case the market potential, due to the contribution from 
the pharmaceutical company, is high it is possible to notice that all events are possible. 
The first mover can pre-empt or she can wait for better alliance conditions or she can 
leave to the follower the possibility to ally, and, in the latter case, the follower might or 
might not take advantage of this opportunity. The intuition behind the above findings 
relates to the fact that the first mover, in the presence of high market potential (or, 
alternatively, low competition level), allies with the pharmaceutical company when the 
payment conditions are satisfactory. Otherwise, the first mover prefers to continue the 
project individually as she can receive indirect benefits from the potential alliance 
between the follower and the pharmaceutical company. What is interesting, however, is 
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that, in the latter case, the follower will not always follow the first mover and compete 
against her without the support of the pharmaceutical company. Rather, the follower 
will sometimes prefer allying with the pharmaceutical company, thus determining an 
increase of the market potential and providing indirect benefits to the first mover. 
Essentially, under competition, the first mover will not always pre-empt the follower 
alliance. On the other hand, if payment conditions are acceptable, the first mover will 
choose to ally, instead of competing individually, due to the overall benefits that will be 
generated through the alliance. 
A less complex picture is obtained when the level of synergies generated with the 
alliance with the pharmaceutical company is not high. In this case, only the first mover 
will partner with the pharmaceutical company. When the first-stage payment is high, the 
alliance will be established in the first stage, otherwise this will happen in the second 
stage. However, if both first stage and second stage payments are low, no alliance will 
be signed. Under this scenario, as the market potential is not high (or, alternatively, the 
competition level is very high), the first mover will never leave room to the follower to 
ally with the pharmaceutical company as the market potential increase is mild. In this 
case, the equilibrium scenarios are the same as the monopoly case. 
This chapter has provided evidence of contrasting arguments from the industry world on 
whether and when biotech firms should partner with big pharmaceutical companies. 
Based on my analysis I argue that none of them is completely right or wrong, in the 
sense that all alliance timing outcomes are possible. In fact, biotech firms can actually 
anticipate, postpone or forgo on alliance with pharmaceutical companies in the presence 
of competitors. However, each outcome will occur under specific conditions. In this 
regard, my results help to provide some guidelines for practitioners with regard to the 
hot issue of alliance timing in the presence of competition. As a matter of fact, in a first 
mover-follower setting, e.g., the example of Forma Therapeutics versus new entrants in 
the protein homeostasis field, the market value added and payments offered by big 
pharma play a crucial role. Biotech firms, who enjoy first mover advantage, should 
always anticipate the follower in signing the licensing agreement when the market value 
does not increase significantly as a consequence of the alliance with the pharmaceutical 
company. A restricted market potential forces the first mover to adopt always a pre-
emptive strategy in order to maintain the competitive advantage over the follower. As 
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discussed earlier, in this case, the amount of payments offered by the pharmaceutical 
company in different stages determines whether the deal should be signed in the first, in 
the second stage or never be signed. On the other hand, when the market value added by 
the presence of the pharmaceutical company is notably high, first mover should not 
always choose to partner with him. Rather, when contract terms are not appealing, first 
mover should let the follower ally to profit more in the final market due to the fact that 
she does not share the profit with the pharmaceutical company, while still benefiting 
from positive spillover. Even when the market potential increases due to the presence of 
the pharmaceutical company, the amount of payments offered by the pharmaceutical 
company in different stages determines whether the deal should be signed in the first, in 
the second stage or never be signed. ! !
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Chapter 3 
Optimal timing for the pharmaceutical company in a ROG 
model 
3.1 Introduction  
In chapter 2, I have analysed alliance timing decisions, developing a model that 
includes the effect of the competition in determining the optimal choice taking the 
perspective of the biotech firms. In this chapter, I analyse R&D alliance timing 
decisions with a holistic perspective that incorporates the active role of both 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms in a stochastic and competitive environment. Indeed, 
the active role of the pharmaceutical company in the alliance timing decisions has been 
disregarded in presence of biotech firm competition. However, considering the 
pharmaceutical company as an active player in the alliance timing game is particularly 
important as well as very realistic, since the pharmaceutical companies usually have a 
dominant role in the strategic alliance timing decisions (Nicholson et al., 2005; Kalamas 
et al., 2002).  
Therefore, in this chapter I intend to fill the gap present in the extant literature on R&D 
alliance timing in the biopharmaceutical industry by explicitly modelling the active role 
of both pharmaceutical and biotech firms in this important decision setting. Specifically, 
to model the strategic interactions among the involved parties and to reflect the 
flexibility of both pharmaceutical and biotech firms to react to the future uncertainties, 
that typically characterize the R&D process in this industry, I develop again a ROG 
model. In the hypothesized setting, the pharmaceutical company has the bargaining 
power to choose among competing biotech firms and offer different profit-maximizing 
contracts in two different stages of the R&D process and the biotech firms can in turn 
decide to accept or reject the pharmaceutical company’s offer. In addition, I consider 
both the case where biotech firms are identical and the case where they are no longer 
identical. In particular, in case of non-identical biotech firms, I suppose that the market 
increase in case of an alliance with one biotech firm is higher as compared to the market 
increase originated from an alliance with the other one. 
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With regard to the type of alliance, I consider a licensing agreement under which only 
the biotech firm has control on the R&D project continuation (or abandonment) option, 
whereas the pharmaceutical company remits to the biotech firm an up-front payment 
when the agreement is signed and royalties upon product commercialization. Therefore, 
the biotech firms’ payoffs are naturally assessed through real options analysis (ROA) 
because they may decide to abandon the project in later stages if the project is no longer 
profitable based on updated information. However, in a setting where both 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms strategically interact, the real options of the biotech 
firms indirectly affect pharmaceutical company’s decisions. In this respect, I explicitly 
model how the pharmaceutical company evaluates and takes into account biotech firms’ 
option exercise decisions in his profit maximization problem, through an option-
conditioned probability. This is an important contribution of this chapter because, to the 
best of my knowledge, in the ROG literature, modelling how firms’ project investment 
decisions depend on real options of other firms has never been investigated. 
Finally, I also compare the alliance timing outcomes of the real options game with the 
case where both parties disregard the uncertainty of the underlying R&D process, thus 
using the NPV (Net Present Value) of the licensed drug as a tool to evaluate the project. 
Indeed, as stated in chapter 1, the NPV is still the dominant methodology utilized to 
evaluate R&D projects in the biopharmaceutical industry, in spite of the fact that, 
differently from ROA, it ignores managers’ flexibility (Myers 1984, Hartmann and 
Hassan 2006, Cassimon et al. 2011). The higher popularity of the NPV methodology as 
compared with ROA is mainly because practitioners usually perceive real options as a 
complex tool, thus often leaning towards simpler methodologies such as the NPV 
(Hartmann and Hassan 2006). However, in doing so, managers tend to disregard the 
consequences of adopting the NPV or other simple methodologies instead of ROA, 
when evaluating the impact of important strategic decisions in the new drug 
development process. For such reason, a growing body of literature has started 
informing managers in the biopharmaceutical industry about the implications of using 
different methodologies to evaluate R&D projects, which may indeed drastically impact 
on firms’ decisions and the relative outcomes. For instance, Cassimon et al. (2011) and 
Baldi et al. (2015) suggest that the licensing deal value in this industry is highly affected 
by the methodology utilized to evaluate the investment project. Indeed, I contribute to 
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this growing strand of literature by investigating how alliance timing decisions are 
influenced by the methodology utilized by managers for new drug investment project 
evaluation, which has never been studied before.  
By way of anticipation, I show that, in presence of high synergies between 
pharmaceutical and identical biotech firms, the second stage is optimal from the 
perspective of the pharmaceutical company when ROA is utilized, whereas any stage is 
optimal under the NPV methodology. In this case the selected biotech firm is the second 
mover under both methodologies. In presence of low synergies, the optimal timing 
depends on the level of royalties assigned to the biotech firm, when ROA is adopted to 
evaluate the investment project. In this case, postponing the alliance to the second stage 
is optimal for the pharmaceutical company as long as the level of royalties is 
sufficiently high. Otherwise, the first stage is optimal. The latter outcome always occurs 
instead when the NPV methodology is utilized. Under both ROA and NPV 
methodologies, the biotech firm moving first is selected for the alliance. In case of non-
identical biotech firms, if the synergies between the pharmaceutical company and the 
first mover are sufficiently high, the optimal timing is the second stage and the alliance 
is signed with the first mover under ROA. Under NPV any stage is optimal and the first 
mover is selected. If the synergies between the pharmaceutical company and the first 
mover are low, ROA leads to more ambiguous results as either firm can be selected and 
either stage can be optimal depending on the level of royalties offered. Differently, 
under the NPV methodology any stage is still optimal, but the second mover is selected. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the 
model introducing firms’ payoff expressions computed using both ROA and NPV 
methodologies. In the following sections, first I present and discuss my findings under 
identical biotech firms. Then I extend the analysis to the case of non-identical biotech 
firms. In the final section, conclusions are drawn. 
3.2 Model development 
Starting from the model presented in chapter 2, I model a two-stages Stackelberg game 
for B1 and B2 that have the opportunity to establish a partnership with a pharmaceutical 
company. In particular, B1 enjoys a first mover advantage. I assume that the 
pharmaceutical company has the bargaining power to make a take-it-or-leave-it contract 
that maximizes his profit. The pharmaceutical company selects biotech firms 
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sequentially and the contract offered by the pharmaceutical company in both stages 
consists of an upfront payment delivered at the beginning of the considered stage to the 
allied biotech firm and of royalties upon drug commercialization. For the sake of 
tractability, I assume that the pharmaceutical company maximizes his own profit by 
choosing the upfront payment in each stage, whereas the royalties are exogenously 
given and are the same for both biotech firms. If no agreement is signed the 
pharmaceutical company makes zero profit from the market. The stage of the game, and 
the correspondent R&D phases, are the same as before. Thus V(t) follows a Geometric 
Brownian Motion (GBM) over the range (t0, t1) and firms are assumed risk-neutral.  
In this model I consider both the case where biotech firms are identical and the case 
where they are no longer identical. Thus, in the former case, the level of synergies 
originated from the alliance is the same no matter which biotech signs the agreement. In 
case of non-identical biotech firms, I suppose that the market increase in case of an 
alliance with B1 is equal to δ B1  and in case of an alliance with B2 is equal to δ B2 . The 
alliance, if any, is mutually exclusive in the sense that the pharmaceutical company will 
only sign the alliance with one biotech firm. I also assume that both biotech firms can 
reach the market individually, which implies that they are not exactly researching on the 
same molecule. Therefore, if one biotech firm signs an alliance with the pharmaceutical 
company, the other can only continue the R&D process individually, with some 
spillover benefits from the competitor’s alliance, but with her own (limited) financial 
resources.  
Cash flows are estimated for all firms under all the possible situations that can arise in 
this setting. Also in this case the game is solved via backward induction by examining 
all the possible branches of the tree illustrated in Figure 9 in in section 2.3. Before 
computing firms’ payoff expressions, I define: 
• Ij = drug research and development investment cost incurred by both biotech 
firms in each stage (j= f, s);  
• r = risk-free interest rate;  
• Vs = value of the project, i.e., expected net cash flows arising after 
commercialization, at the beginning of the second stage (i.e., at time t1); 
• Vf = present value of Vs, i.e., expected net cash flows arising after 
commercialization, at the beginning of the first stage (i.e., at time t0); 
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• Pf,Bi = upfront payment offered by the pharmaceutical company to the biotech i 
at the beginning of the first stage in case of alliance (pharmaceutical company’s 
decision variable);  
• Ps,Bi = upfront payment offered by the pharmaceutical company to the biotech i 
at the beginning of the second stage in case of alliance (pharmaceutical 
company’s decision variable); 
• α f = percentage of royalties that the pharmaceutical company receives in case of 
alliance in the first stage; 
• α s = percentage of royalties that the pharmaceutical company receives in case of 
alliance in the second stage. 
• γ  = B1 market share in case no alliance is signed ( (1−γ )  for B2); 
• β  = market share of the biotech firm signing the alliance in the first stage or in 
the second stage; 
• (1− β )  = market share of the “stand-alone” biotech firm when the other player 
signs the alliance in the first stage or in the second stage; 
• δ Bi  = amplification factor (>1)  (with Bi = B1, B2), i.e. the value added to the 
drug by the synergies derived from the alliance between the pharmaceutical 
company and the biotech partner. 
3.2.1 Computing firms’ payoff expressions 
Before solving the game via backward induction approach, I present biotech firms’ and 
pharmaceutical company’s payoff expressions in all possible branches of the tree in 
Figure 9 in section 2.3. Specifically, in computing firms’ payoff expressions, I consider 
that all firms adopt a real option logic to evaluate the project investment and make 
decisions. I derive firms’ second stage payoff expressions, i.e. the payoff expressions 
when the alliance is signed in the second stage or no alliance is signed, both computed 
at time t1 and discounted at time t0 (since they come from commercialization starting at 
t1), and firms’ first stage payoffs, i.e. the payoff expressions when the alliance is signed 
in the first stage (i.e., at time t0). In order to comparing ROA and NPV methodologies, I 
also derive the same payoff expressions under the NPV methodology. 
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3.2.2 Biotech firms’ payoff expressions 
Biotech firms’ payoff expressions are computed similarly as described in chapter 2. I 
denote the biotech firms’ payoff expressions as 
 
π j,Bi
Bk , where j=f (first), s (second) stands 
for the stage at which the agreement is signed, Bi = B1, B2 represents the biotech firm 
that signs the agreement and Bk = B1, B2 the biotech firm to which the payoff is 
referred. In case no alliance is signed the subscript (j, Bi) is eliminated. 
At time t1 uncertainty about the value of the project is partially resolved and, therefore, 
the simple NPV methodology can be adopted. Table 11 shows the second stage payoff 
expressions of biotech firms, 
 π s,Bi
Bk (t1) . Note that I restrict the analysis to a region of 
parameters that ensures positive payoffs. 
Table 11: NPV/ROA biotech firms’ second stage payoff expressions. 
Scenario 
B1’s Payoff B2’s Payoff 
 π s,Bi
B1 (t1)   π s,Bi
B2 (t1)  
B1 signs the 
alliance at Stage II 
(1−α s )βδ B1Vs + Ps,B1 − Is  (1− β )δ B1Vs − Is  
B2 signs the 
alliance at Stage II 
(1− β )δ B2Vs − Is  (1−α s )βδ B2Vs + Ps,B2 − Is  
No alliance γVs − Is  (1−γ )Vs − Is  
 
Moving to time t0, I model the present value of second stage payoff expressions 
backtracked at t0 and first stage payoff expressions using ROA by adopting the Black 
and Scholes formula with the same logic reported in chapter 2. In Table 12 I report the 
underlying values of the biotech call options for all scenarios.10 As in chapter 2, 
 
C j,Bi
Bk  is 
the biotech call option. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 It is important to note that all the call options have the same exercise price equal to Is. 
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Table 12: Call Option 
 
C j,Bi
Bk  underlying values. 
Scenario  
C j,Bk
B1  (Underlying) 
 
C j,Bk
B2  (Underlying) 
B1 signs the 
alliance at 
Stage I 
 
C f ,B1
B1
 
((1−α f )βδ B1Vf )   C f ,B1
B2
 
((1− β )δ B1Vf )  
B2 signs the 
alliance at 
Stage I 
 
C f ,B2
B1
 
((1− β )δ B2Vf )   C f ,B2
B2
 
((1−α f )βδ B2Vf )  
B1 signs the 
alliance at 
Stage II 
 Cs,B1
B1
 ((1−α s )βδ B1Vf + Ps,B1e
−rτ )   Cs,B1
B2
 ((1− β )δ B1Vf )  
B2 signs the 
alliance at 
Stage II 
 Cs,B2
B1
 ((1− β )δ B2Vf )   Cs,B2
B2
 ((1−α s )βδ B2Vf + Ps,B2e
−rτ )  
No alliance CB1  (γVf )  C
B2
 ((1−γ )Vf )  
 
In Table 13 I report first stage payoff expressions and second stage payoff expressions 
backtracked to time t0 for the biotech firms. 
Table 13: ROA biotech firms’ first stage payoff expressions and second stage payoff 
expressions backtracked to time t0. 
Scenario 
B1’s Payoff  B2’s Payoff  
 π j ,Bi
B1 (t0 )   π j ,Bi
B2 (t0 )  
B1 signs the 
alliance at Stage 
I 
 C f ,B1
B1 − I f + Pf ,B1   
C f ,B1
B2 − I f  
B2 signs the 
alliance at Stage 
I 
 
C f ,B2
B1 − I f   C f ,B2
B2 − I f + Pf ,B2  
B1 signs the 
alliance at Stage 
II 
 Cs,B1
B1 − I f   Cs,B1
B2 − I f  
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B2 signs the 
alliance at Stage 
II 
 
Cs,B2
B1 − I f   
Cs,B2
B2 − I f  
No alliance  
C B1 − I f   
C B2 − I f  
 
3.2.3 Pharmaceutical company’s payoff expressions 
Concerning the pharmaceutical company, his payoff expressions are indicated as 
 
π j,Bi
P  
where j = f, s stands for the stage at which the agreement is signed, Bi = B1, B2 
represents the biotech firm that signs the agreement. I derive pharmaceutical company’s 
second stage payoff expressions adopting the simple NPV methodology. They are 
reported in Table 14. 
Table 14: NPV/ROA pharmaceutical company’s second stage payoff expressions. 
Scenario 
Pharma’s Payoff 
 π s,Bi
P (t1)  
B1 signs the 
alliance at Stage II 
α sβδ B1Vs − Ps,B1  
B2 signs the 
alliance at Stage II 
α sβδ B2Vs − Ps,B2  
No alliance 0 
 
In this setting, moving to the first stage, the pharmaceutical company does not have a 
proper option. However, the strategic interactions with the biotech firms imply that his 
decisions on the upfront payments to offer to each potential partner are naturally 
influenced by biotech firms’ option to abandon the project development before the 
second stage occurs. I show in detail how the pharmaceutical company’s payoff 
expression should be computed. In particular, I provide an example to illustrate how to 
obtain the present value (i.e., at time t0) of payoff expressions coming from an alliance 
signed in the second stage starting from those computed in Table 14. Specifically, I 
consider the case where B1 signs the alliance with the pharmaceutical company in the 
second stage. Pharmaceutical company’s second stage payoff expression backtracked to 
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time t0 depends on the decision of B1: if B1 decides to continue with the project (i.e. B1 
will exercise the option), the pharmaceutical company’s second stage expected payoff 
discounted at t0 will be given by: 
 
π s,B1
P (t0 ) = E α sβδ B1Vs − Ps,B1 ((1−α s )βδ B1Vs + Ps,B1) > Is⎡⎣
⎤
⎦Pr ((1−α s )βδ B1Vs + Ps,B1) > Is⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  (36) 
Where 
 
E α sβδ B1Vs − Ps,B1 ((1−α s )βδ B1Vs + Ps,B1) > Is⎡⎣
⎤
⎦  represents the expectation value of 
 (α sβδ B1Vs − Ps,B1)
 given that the option is exercised (
 ((1−α s )βδ B1Vs + Ps,B1) > Is ) times the 
probability that the option will be exercised by B1 
 
Pr ((1−α s )βδ B1Vs + Ps,B1) > Is⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( ) . 
Following Nielsen (1992) and Chance (2014), I express this conditional expected value 
as 
 
α sβδ B1V f − Ps,B1(t0 )  times N (d1 Cs,B1B1( )) , which is the N (d1)  of the call option  Cs,B1
B1 , i.e., 
the call option of the considered scenario, i.e. B1 allies in the second stage and I refer to 
it as N d1 Cs,B1B1( )( )  and it represents the “option-conditioned probability”.  
In general, pharmaceutical company’s second stage payoff expression backtracked to 
time t0 is equal to: 
π s,Bi
P (t0 ) = αsβδBiVf − Ps,Bi (t0 )( ) ⋅N (d1 Cs,BiBi( ))        (37) 
where i = 1, 2. Similarly, his first stage payoff expression is:11 
π f ,Bi
P (t0 ) = α f βδBiVf( ) ⋅N (d1 C f ,BiBi( ))− Pf ,Bi        (38) 
In Table 15 I report payoff expressions backtracked to time t0 for the pharmaceutical 
company. 
Table 15: Pharmaceutical company’s first stage payoff expressions and second stage payoff 
expressions backtracked to time t0. 
Scenario 
Pharma’s Payoff 
 
π j,Bi
P (t0 )  
B1 signs the 
alliance at Stage I 
α fβδ B1Vf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− Pf ,B1  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 It is noteworthy that when the alliance is signed in the first stage the pharmaceutical company 
can incur in a net loss (the upfront payment remitted in the first stage) if the partner will not 
exercise the option. 
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B2 signs the 
alliance at Stage I 
α fβδ B2Vf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− Pf ,B2  
B1 signs the 
alliance at Stage II 
(α sβδ B1Vf − Ps,B1(t0 ))N (d1(Cs,B1B1 ))  
B2 signs the 
alliance at Stage II 
(α sβδ B2Vf − Ps,B2 (t0 ))N (d1(Cs,B2B2 ))  
No alliance 0 
 
3.2.4 NPV firms’ payoff expressions 
One of the objective of this chapter is to shed light on the consequences, in terms of 
alliance timing decisions, of disregarding the use of ROA for new drug investment 
project evaluation. Therefore I present both biotech firms’ and pharmaceutical 
company’s payoff expressions as if the all involved players use the NPV methodology 
to evaluate their payoffs related to the new drug project investment. In this case, the 
second stage payoffs computed at t1 are the same as those reported in Table 11 and 
Table 14 (as second stage ROA payoffs are computed as NPV because there is no 
further option to exercise). Differently from ROA, the second stage payoff expressions 
backtracked to time t0 under NPV are just discounted by  e−rt . Therefore, in Table 16 I 
only report first stage payoff expressions of both biotech firms and the pharmaceutical 
company computed using the NPV methodology. 
Table 16: Firms’ NPV first stage payoff expressions. 
Scenario 
B’s 1Payoff B2’s Payoff Pharma Payoff 
 
π f ,Bi
B1  
 
π f ,Bi
B2  
 
π f ,Bi
P  
B1 signs 
the alliance 
at Stage I 
(1−α f )βδ B1Vf + Pf ,B1 −
−Is − I f  
(1− β )δ B1Vf − Is − I f  α fβδ B1Vf − Pf ,B1  
B2 signs 
the alliance 
at Stage I 
(1− β )δ B2Vf − Is − I f  
(1−α f )βδ B2Vf + Pf ,B2 −
−Is − I f  
α fβδ B2Vf − Pf ,B2  
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3.3 Game solution with identical biotech firms (symmetric case) 
First I consider the case of identical biotech firms, to which I refer as the symmetric 
case. Hence, the level of synergies generated from the alliance is the same for both 
firms δ B1 = δ B2 = δ >1( ) . This implies that in each stage the same upfront payment Pj 
(where j stands for the stage) is offered by the pharmaceutical company to either biotech 
firms. Solving the above-described game, pharmaceutical company has to choose 
between different alternatives; Figure 15 shows all the sub-games and cases originated. 
In particular, after having solved the second stage, similarly as reported in chapter 2, I 
distinguish two cases depending on the value of δ . I refer to the case δ > (1−γ ) / (1− β )  
as high synergies and to the case δ < (1−γ ) / (1− β )  as low synergies (please refer to 
Appendix A for the threshold definition). In the first stage, under ROA methodology, 
the case of low synergies needs to be further split in Case A and Case B for the sake of 
analytical tractability. 
In presence of identical biotech firms under ROA yields the optimal alliance timing for 
the pharmaceutical company and the biotech firm chosen for the alliance, which has 
been summarized in Proposition 1. The detailed derivation of these results is reported in 
Appendix A. 
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Figure 15: Cases and sub-games in case of identical biotech firms. 
However, note that in presence of low synergies I not include the result of the optimal 
timing in this Proposition, as such result cannot be obtained analytically. 
Proposition 1. (ROA Optimal alliance timing) 
Using real options methodology, the pharmaceutical company allies with B2 in case of 
high synergies, whereas he allies with B1 in presence of low synergies. The optimal 
alliance time for the pharmaceutical company in presence of high synergies is the 
second stage. 
Results from Proposition 1 suggest that both biotech firms have the opportunity to sign 
the agreement, and which biotech firm will be selected depends on the level of 
synergies. In particular in case of low synergies B1 decides to enjoy her first mover 
advantage and pre-empts the rival, whereas when the first mover can benefit from a 
high level of synergies, due to the presence of spillover effects, B1 leaves to B2 room to 
sign the agreement. Regarding the alliance timing, due to the fact that the 
pharmaceutical company has the bargaining power, he prefers to ally in the second 
stage. The rationale of this behaviour is related to the presence of the option-
conditioned probability. That is, in my ROG model the pharmaceutical company can 
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take into account the risk of incurring a net loss (equal to the first stage upfront 
payment) in case the biotech partner does not exercise the option later. In particular, this 
loss becomes very relevant in presence of high synergies as the high level of δ  implies 
a high level of upfront payment. To better understand the analytical derivation I provide 
a representative comparison based on a case study available in Rogers et al. (2002). 
Specifically, I consider a drug in the third clinical phase and the values of the required 
parameters are: Vf = $400M, σ = 30%, r = 5%, τ = 2, If = $75M, Is = $180M, γ = 0,5. In 
addition, I suppose the following values: β = 0.65  and δ = 1.6 .  
Figure 16 reports the trends of the pharmaceutical company’s payoffs for the final 
comparison in the game tree, in case of high synergies, i.e. pharmaceutical company’s 
payoff in case of an alliance with B1 in the first stage or in case of alliance with B2 in 
the second stage (see Appendix A). I observe that, while 
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )  (where * represents 
the optimal pharmaceutical company’s payoff) is independent from the amount of 
royalties, 
 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  decreases as α f  increases due to the larger losses that the 
pharmaceutical company faces if the partner does not exercise the option. Consistent 
with Proposition 1, in high synergies case Figure 16 shows that the pharmaceutical 
company prefers to ally with B2 in the second stage. 
 
Figure 16: Trends of pharmaceutical company’s payoffs in the last comparisons of the game 
tree in case of identical biotech firms and high synergies (i.e. alliance with B1 in the first stage 
or with B2 in the second stage). 
In presence of low synergies, the analysis shows that two possible solutions, namely the 
case of alliance with B1 in the second stage and the case of alliance with B1 in the first 
stage, can be optimal from the perspective of the pharmaceutical company. However, I 
!
!
!
α f
 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 )
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )
 
π j,B1
*P (t0 )
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cannot analytically determine the conditions under which one solution dominates the 
other solution in terms of pharmaceutical company’s payoffs or vice versa. Thus, I 
conduct a numerical analysis and a sensitive analysis to derive the ranges where either 
solution arises as the optimum. In the range of parameters ensuring the existence of the 
low synergy case, I modify the level of β  and also the values of δ . I rely on the same 
case study above. Figure 17 shows a representative comparison between pharmaceutical 
company’s payoff in case of alliance with B1 in the second stage (in orange) and 
pharmaceutical company’s payoff in case of alliance with B1 in the first stage (in blue) 
for β = 0.6 . Even in presence of low synergies, the pharmaceutical company prefers to 
ally with B1 in the second stage for a large range of parameters. However, differently 
from the case of high synergies, here I notice that, for low values of α f , the optimal 
solution is to ally with B1 in the first stage. The intuition behind this behaviour is again 
related to the role played by the option-conditioned probability. Specifically, in case of 
low synergies, when α f , i.e. the percentage of royalties retained by the pharmaceutical 
company, is low, the upfront payment offered to the biotech firm is also low. Given the 
lower upfront payment, the pharmaceutical company is more willing to incur the risk of 
losing it in case the biotech partner decides to not exercise the option. In other words, 
the disadvantage for the pharmaceutical company of allying in the first stage is 
considerably diminished when α f is small because the potential loss is also small. In 
contrast, the advantage of allying in the first stage is increased. In fact, in case of low 
synergies, biotech firms have even more incentive to form the alliance, as they would 
not be able to benefit much from spillovers if they had to reach the market individually. 
As a result, they are more prone to immediately accept very low payments in order to 
pre-empt the competitor, thus making the pharmaceutical company better off in case of 
alliance in the first stage.  
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Figure 17: Trends of pharmaceutical company’s payoffs in the last comparison of the game tree 
in case of symmetric biotech firms and low synergies (i.e., alliance with B1 in the first stage or 
in the second stage). !
I also solved the above-described game under NPV methodology. Proposition 2 exhibits 
the optimal alliance timing for the pharmaceutical company and the biotech firm chosen 
for the alliance. The detailed derivation of this result can be found in the Appendix A.  
Proposition 2. (NPV Optimal alliance timing) 
Using NPV methodology, in presence of high synergies the pharmaceutical company 
allies with B2 and any alliance time is optimal for him. In presence of low synergies the 
pharmaceutical company allies with B1 and the optimal time is the first stage. 
I note that, with regard to the biotech firm that is selected for the alliance, the use of the 
NPV methodology yields the same outcome as the ROA methodology. As a matter of 
fact, B2 is selected in presence of high synergies and B1 is chosen in case of low 
synergies also under the NPV methodology. Nevertheless, the optimal alliance timing 
changes radically. Indeed, when the NPV methodology is adopted to evaluate the 
investment project, in presence of high synergies the choice of the optimal alliance time 
is totally irrelevant for the pharmaceutical company as any stage yields the same payoff. 
This result suggests that, at least in presence of high synergies, the NPV methodology 
fails to capture the uncertainty characterizing the R&D process and thus fails to 
incorporate the risk incurred by the pharmaceutical company in case of first stage 
alliance to lose the upfront payment if the biotech partner decides to abandon the project 
in the second stage. The same intuition holds also in presence of low synergies. Indeed, 
while under the NPV methodology the optimal timing is to ally in the first stage due to 
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pre-emption reasons,12 under ROA the second stage can be preferred in presence of low 
values of α f . As I have already underscored, this suggests that using ROA rather than 
the NPV methodology, the pharmaceutical company is able to capture the risk related to 
the option at disposal of the biotech partner in case of alliance in the first stage. 
3.4 Game solution with non-identical biotech firms (asymmetric case)  
In this section, I extend the analysis to the case of non-identical biotech firms, to which 
I refer as the asymmetric case. Specifically, I assume the market increase in case of an 
alliance with B1 is higher as compared with the market increase originated from an 
alliance with B2. That is, without loss of generality, I assume δ B1 > δ B2 >1 . This implies 
that also the upfront payments offered by the pharmaceutical company to the biotech 
firms will be different. Specifically, Pj ,B1  and Pj ,B2  are offered to B1 and B2, 
respectively, in stage j = 1, 2. 
Solving the above-described game pharmaceutical company has to choose between 
different alternatives, Figure 18 shows all the sub-games and cases originated. In 
particular, after have solved the second stage, similarly to the symmetric case, I can still 
distinguish two cases depending on the value of δ B1 . Specifically, I distinguish the case 
δ B1 > (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β  (to which I refer as  δ B1  high or Case 1) and the case 
δ B1 < (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β  (to which I refer as  δ B1  low or Case 2). With ROA methodology, 
the former case needs to be further split in Case A and Case B. 
Solving the alliance timing game in presence of non-identical biotech firms under ROA 
yields the optimal alliance timing for the pharmaceutical company and the biotech firm 
chosen for the alliance. The detailed derivation of this result can be found in Appendix 
B. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 As a matter of fact, the NPV methodology is biased in favour of early market entry because it 
takes into account the risk of waiting (pre-emption) but not the rewards of waiting (reduced 
uncertainty) (Krychowski and Quelin, 2010). 
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Figure 18: Cases and sub-games in case of non-identical biotech firms. 
However, in Proposition 3, I can only present the case δ B1 > (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β , as the 
alternative case can be exclusively treated numerically.  
Proposition 3. (ROA Optimal alliance timing) 
Using real options methodology, if δ B1  is high (i.e., δ B1 > (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β ) the 
pharmaceutical company allies with B1 and the optimal alliance time for the 
pharmaceutical company is the second stage.  
From Proposition 3, I observe that when the synergies derived from the alliance 
between the pharmaceutical company and B1 are sufficiently high, i.e., 
δ B1 > (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β , the pharmaceutical company naturally prefers allying with the 
first mover, i.e., B1, given the larger benefit such partner can provide in terms of market 
increase. With regard to the optimal alliance timing, similarly to the symmetric case, the 
rationale of the result is due to the risk incurred by the pharmaceutical company of 
losing the upfront payment, when allying in the first stage, in case the biotech partner 
decides to abandon the project in the second stage. Therefore, the optimal decision for 
the pharmaceutical company is, to postpone the alliance to the second stage. To better 
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understand the analytical derivation also in this case I provide a representative 
comparison when  δ B1  is high based on the case study available in Rogers et al. (2002). 
Furthermore I suppose that δ B1 = 1.5  and δ B2 = 1.3 . Figure 19 shows the trends of the 
pharmaceutical company’s payoffs for the final comparisons in the game tree between 
the possible solutions in Case A and the possible solutions in Case B. Specifically, in 
Case A the final comparison is between 
 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  (where * represents the optimal 
pharmaceutical company’s payoff), i.e. alliance with B1 in the first stage, and 
 π s,B1
*P (t0 ) , 
i.e. alliance with B1 in the second stage, whereas in Case B it is between 
 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) , i.e. 
alliance with B1 in the first stage, and 
 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) , i.e. alliance with B2 in the first stage. 
Similarly as the symmetric case, in case of an alliance in the first stage, pharmaceutical 
company’s payoff decreases as α f  increases due to the larger losses in which 
pharmaceutical company incurs if the partner does not exercise the option. The reader 
can note that, as δ B1  is high, the profit that the pharmaceutical company obtains in case 
of alliance with B1, independently from the alliance timing, is higher than the profit in 
case of alliance with B2. Due to the lower level of uncertainty characterizing the second 
stage, the solution of an alliance with B1 in the second stage, i.e. Case A, dominates the 
other case (see Appendix B). 
 
Figure 19: Trends of pharmaceutical company’s payoffs in the last comparison of the game tree 
in case of non identical biotech firms and Case 1 (both Case A and Case B). 
The case when δ B1 < (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β cannot be solved analytically because, using the 
ROA methodology, it is not possible to establish whether the pharmaceutical company’s 
!
!
! π f ,B1*P (t0 )
 π s,B1
*P (t0 )
 
π j,B1
*P (t0 )
! α f
 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 )
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profit is higher or lower when allying with B1 in the first stage or when allying with B2 
in the second stage (see Appendix B). Thus I conduct a numerical analysis also in this 
case. Similarly to the symmetric case, I use data provided by Rogers et al. (2002). 
Figure 20a and Figure 20b show a representative comparison between pharmaceutical 
company’s payoff in case of alliance with B2 in the second stage (in red) and 
pharmaceutical company’s payoff in case of alliance with B1 in the first stage (in blue) 
for δ B1 = 1.3  and δ B1 = 2 , respectively. In the representative example, for β  varying 
from 0.5 to 0.75 I observe that, as long as α f  is low, pharmaceutical company’s payoff 
in case of alliance with B1 in the first stage is higher than pharmaceutical company’s 
payoff in case of alliance with B2 in the second stage. This result suggests that, for low 
values of δ B1  and sufficiently high level of α f , the first mover is more demanding and 
asks for a higher level of upfront payment. Therefore, the pharmaceutical company 
decides to ally with B2 in the second stage, as he would not risk of losing the upfront 
payment in case the biotech partner decides to not exercise the option. When α f  is low, 
the first mover requires a lower level of the upfront payment, therefore the 
pharmaceutical company prefers to ally with her in the first stage due to the higher 
synergies she can bring and the fact that the potential loss is sufficiently small. Finally, 
note that the area of the alliance in the first stage decreases as δ B1  increases, since the 
value of the upfront payment increases as well. 
!
20a) !
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20b) 
Figure 20a and 20b: Trends of pharmaceutical company’s payoffs in the last comparisons of the 
game tree in case of asymmetric biotech firms and δ B1 < (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β . 
I also analytically solved the asymmetric case under the NPV methodology. Proposition 
4 exhibits the optimal alliance timing for the pharmaceutical company and the biotech 
firm chosen for the alliance. The detailed derivation of this result can be found in 
Appendix B.  
Proposition 4. (NPV Optimal alliance timing) 
Using NPV methodology, if δ B1  is high, i.e., δ B1 > (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β , the pharmaceutical 
company allies with B1, otherwise he allies with B2. In both cases alliance time is 
indifferent for the pharmaceutical company. 
Similarly to the symmetric case with high synergies, the alliance timing decision is 
irrelevant when the NPV methodology is adopted, as any stage yields the same payoff 
from the perspective of the pharmaceutical company. Once again, this suggests that, 
differently from ROA, the NPV methodology fails to capture the risk incurred by the 
pharmaceutical company with regard to the option at disposal of the biotech partner to 
abandon the project later on when they ally in the first stage. Concerning the selected 
alliance partner, the choice depends on the level of the synergies, δ B1 , between the 
pharmaceutical company and the first mover. When such level of synergies is 
sufficiently high, the first mover is selected, otherwise the alliance is formed with the 
follower. The result in the first case is quite intuitive, given the larger benefit B1 can 
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provide in terms of market increase. In case of δ B1  low, as stated above, pharmaceutical 
company prefers to ally with B2 in accordance with the fact that the first mover requires 
a higher level of payment than the follower. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined alliance timing decisions in a setting where a 
pharmaceutical company can choose between two competing biotech firms to form an 
exclusive alliance offering different profit-maximizing contracts at different stages of 
the R&D process that the biotech firms can in turn decide to accept or reject. To 
incorporate the above-mentioned features of the typical biopharmaceutical environment, 
and thus better capture the trade-off facing both pharmaceutical and biotech firms, I 
have proposed a real options game approach. Under this approach I have determined the 
optimal alliance timing and the selected biotech firm to ally with. I have then shed light 
on whether and how alliance timing changes if firms utilize the simple NPV 
methodology instead of the proposed real options approach to evaluate a new drug 
investment project.  
My findings can be summarized as follows. In a setting where biotech firms are 
identical, the adoption of ROA provides the pharmaceutical company with the incentive 
to postpone the alliance to the second stage when the market potential increases 
significantly as a result of the alliance, i.e., when the synergies between pharmaceutical 
and biotech firms are sufficiently high. In contrast, in the same scenario, if the NPV 
were adopted, the pharmaceutical company would be completely indifferent between 
the two stages. On the other hand, if the synergies are low, while only the first stage is 
optimal when the NPV methodology is adopted, the results in terms of alliance timing 
using ROA are more complex with either stage being optimal under specific conditions. 
Indeed, broadly speaking, the use of ROA tends to postpone the alliance timing to the 
second stage because, via the option-conditioned probability, it allows incorporating the 
risk incurred by the pharmaceutical company of losing the upfront payment when 
allying in the first stage in case the biotech partner does not exercise the option. This 
implies that the optimal alliance time is, in general, the second stage. However, I have 
shown that, in a low synergy scenario, when the level of upfront payment to be offered 
to the partner is low, which occurs in presence of low values of royalties, the 
pharmaceutical company does not face a relevant risk. Rather, he can benefit from the 
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fact that, in presence of low synergies, biotech firms are more prone to immediately 
accept very low payments in order to pre-empt the competitor. As a result, the 
pharmaceutical company can make higher profit when allying in the first stage even 
when ROA is utilized. With regard to which biotech firm is selected to form the 
alliance, I show that under either methodology the second mover is selected for the 
alliance in case of high synergies, whereas the first mover is selected in case of low 
synergies.  
I have also introduced asymmetry between biotech firms by assuming that the first 
mover biotech firm leads to a larger market potential when allying with the 
pharmaceutical company than the second mover. In this case, I have found that when 
the value of the synergies between the pharmaceutical company and the first mover 
biotech firm are sufficiently large, the results in terms of alliance timing are 
qualitatively unchanged as compared with the symmetric case (in presence of high 
synergies). The only difference between symmetric and asymmetric scenarios in 
presence of sufficiently high synergies is related to the biotech that is selected. Indeed, 
in the asymmetric setting, the pharmaceutical company will form the alliance with the 
first mover, whereas in the symmetric case the second mover is selected. There are 
more significant differences in presence of low synergies between the first mover and 
the pharmaceutical company. In fact, under the asymmetric case, the use of real options 
leads to more ambiguous results as either firm can be selected and either stage can be 
optimal depending on the level of royalties offered, whereas using the NPV  
methodology any stage is still optimal, but the second mover is selected. In contrast, in 
the symmetric case the pharmaceutical company selects the first mover with either 
methodology and signs the agreement in the first stage under NPV and in the first or in 
second stage (depending on the royalties value) under ROA. 
Overall, in most of the cases, my findings suggest that the pharmaceutical company has 
more incentive to postpone the alliance to the second stage when the real options are 
adopted to evaluate the investment project. The intuition behind this result is that by 
using the real options methodology, the pharmaceutical company can take into account 
the risk related to the fact that the biotech firm may decide to discontinue the 
development process in the second stage based on updated information in case of (her 
own) negative profit. As a result, the pharmaceutical company naturally tends to offer a 
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contract to form the alliance in the second stage. There are circumstances, however, 
under which the alliance will be signed in the first stage when real options methodology 
is utilized. This can happen in presence of low synergies (under both symmetric and 
asymmetric cases) because in this case the first mover has less incentive to reject the 
offer from the pharmaceutical company, given that the benefits obtainable via spillover 
are much more limited. Hence, the first mover will immediately accept the offered 
contract leaving no room to the second mover. Moreover, my findings suggests that the 
NPV methodology is not effective in capturing the above risk facing the pharmaceutical 
company, thus leading to indifference in the preference of the optimal alliance timing in 
most of the circumstances. ! !
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Chapter 4 
Conclusions 
4.1 Contributions 
The aim of this thesis is to study the evaluation of R&D alliances timing decisions 
under uncertainty. Pharmaceutical companies more and more partner with 
biotechnology companies to develop new products. The emergence of numerous 
alliances between these two types of actors poses several relevant questions to the 
innovation management community. One is certainly related to the alliance timing, 
which is currently discussed in the biotech industrial world. As pharmaceutical 
companies become more attracted to biotech products and search more collaboration 
opportunities, both biotech firms and pharmaceutical companies face decisions such 
whether and, possibly, when to ally. In this context, the objective of this work is to 
determine the optimal time to sign an R&D partnership by considering the important 
role of competition. In addition, due to the intrinsic characteristics of the drug R&D 
process, I have also taken into account the uncertainty of the economic environment in 
which timing decisions are made. In order to do so, I have adopted a real options game 
approach, developing a model to investigate this type of decisions in presence of 
competition between two biotech firms who can partner with a pharmaceutical company 
offering a mutually exclusive take-it-or-leave-it contract. 
In the literature, papers that analyse firms’ optimal alliance timing mainly adopt 
empirical approaches. Few works develop analytical models considering the uncertainty 
that characterize the market. However all these studies do not consider the role of 
competition. Starting from this premise, this thesis provides several contributions to 
these streams of research, as already anticipated in the conclusions of chapter 2 and 
chapter 3. 
The main contribution is to shed light on the optimal timing for firms to sign an 
agreement when uncertainty and competition in the market are considered. I take a 
holistic perspective considering the active role of both biotech firms and pharmaceutical 
company. Specifically, I have found that who ally with and when are determined by 
“alliance conditions”, i.e. on the contract terms offered by the pharmaceutical company, 
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the market value increase originated from the alliance with the pharmaceutical 
company, as well as the competitive advantage one biotech firm gains against the 
competitor due to the alliance. In particular, not only the first mover will find profitable 
form the alliance but also the follower. This happens when the level of synergies 
generated from the alliance is sufficiently high. Thus the first mover prefers to continue 
the project individually as she receives indirect benefits from the potential alliance 
between the follower and the pharmaceutical company.  
Regarding the alliance timing, the presence of the option-conditioned probability 
determines the optimal strategy for the pharmaceutical company. Indeed, assuming that 
the pharmaceutical company has the bargaining power to maximize his profit, he has 
more incentive to postpone the alliance to the second stage due to the fact that he takes 
into account biotech firms’ option exercise decisions in his profit maximization 
problem. Therefore, another important contribution is given by explicitly model how, in 
vertical relationships, firms’ project investment decisions depend on real options of 
other firms. 
Moreover, from a methodological point of view, my thesis contributes to the stream of 
research that develops real options valuation models for investments under uncertainty. 
Specifically, I have studied the role of the methodology utilized to evaluate the new 
drug investment project in the alliance timing decisions. Essentially, I found that the use 
of the real options methodology has a different impact on the optimal alliance timing 
decisions as compared to the use of the traditional NPV methodology. In particular, 
NPV methodology is not able to capture the uncertainty characterizing the R&D process 
and the decision maker flexibility, leading to indifference in the preference of the 
optimal alliance timing in most of the circumstances. In fact, NPV methodology fails to 
incorporate the risk incurred by the pharmaceutical company in case of first stage 
alliance to lose the upfront payment if the biotech partner decides to not continue the 
project in the second stage. Therefore, real options are the appropriate tool to evaluate 
the R&D process because can tackle with the managers’ flexibility that allows making 
further investments only in case of positive expected payoffs. To take into account also 
the strategic interactions between firms the real option game approach has been 
adopted. Differently from the previous literature, I developed a setting where firms 
strategically interact not for investment timing decisions but for alliance timing 
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decisions. In doing so, I have overcome the traditional distinction between discrete and 
continuous time ROG models. Specifically, I developed a two stage game model where 
the underlying follows a continuous process, i.e. Geometric Brownian Motion, but the 
strategic decisions of ally or not are made in discrete points of time. This structure 
allows to model accurately the drug R&D process, which is divided into several stages, 
and firms’ decision process, in which decisions are usually made in discrete points of 
time, for instance at the beginning of a new R&D stage. Moreover the model provides a 
closed-form solution that allows to preserve analytical tractability and provides more 
accurate solutions.  
4.2 Managerial implications 
The research provided in this thesis has also several important managerial implications. 
These offer some guidelines and recommendations for supporting managers, involved 
in the R&D alliance timing decisions in the biopharmaceutical industry, in the 
important decision on whether and when they should collaborate with other firms in a 
competitive environment, characterized by an amount of uncertainty over the future 
rewards from the investment. 
Particularly, from the perspective of the biotech firms, managers should pay attention to 
the market value increase due to the alliance, the contract terms offered by the company 
partner as well as to the level of competition. Specifically, supposing that the firm 
enjoys first mover advantage and the potential market is high enough, managers should 
not always choose to sign the agreement. Thus, when contract terms are not appealing, 
first mover may find more profitable let the follower ally to reach the market alone 
benefiting from positive spillover and without sharing the profit with the partner 
company. Conversely, when contract terms are satisfactory or the potential market is 
not sufficiently high, or, alternatively, the competition level is very high, managers 
should always pre-empt the other firm. In case the first mover leads to a significantly 
higher potential market when ally with the pharmaceutical company as compared to the 
second mover, managers of the leader firm should resort to the alliance. 
From the perspective of the pharmaceutical company, managers should take into 
account on one side benefits, in terms of synergies generated in alliance, that each 
biotech could bring and, on the other side, the risks of incur in high level of losses due 
to the fact the he cannot decide on the continuation of the R&D process. Specifically, in 
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case the potential partners are identical, managers should prefer to postpone the alliance 
to late stages to avoid losses in case of interruption of the R&D process, unless the 
upfront payment required by the biotech is extremely low. When the pharmaceutical 
company can obtain a significant higher market increase in case of alliance with the first 
mover, managers should partner with this company. If this advantage is not significant, 
managers should select the other biotech due to her request of lower contract terms. 
However they should always prefer the second stage unless the leader requires a 
sufficiently low upfront payment, in this case an alliance with her in the first stage could 
be possible. 
In addition, through the use of real options, managers are able to capture the unique 
characteristics of R&D investment projects in the biopharmaceutical industry. Managers 
of the biotech firms can accurately evaluate the R&D project, update their information 
when become available and, in their considerations, consider the possibility of 
discontinue the development process in case of negative profit expectation. Using real 
options perspective, managers of the pharmaceutical companies are provided with an 
instrument that reflects their flexibility and thus can help them to anticipate other 
players’ behaviours more effectively. In spite of the fact that the real options approach 
has often been criticized for its apparent complexity, managers should consider the 
consequences of choosing different methodologies to evaluate R&D investment 
projects, as the methodology comparison reported in chapter 3 suggest. Specifically, 
they should be aware that the adoption of different methodologies could yield very 
different outcomes in terms of alliance timing, which could ultimately influence firms’ 
profitability. To overcome their diffidence and help them, it is necessary to develop 
models more adequate to their expectations. In this sense, in the models reported in this 
dissertation, the adoption of a closed-form solution makes the implementation of the 
real options models less complex, in terms of constraints and variables involved in the 
problem, as compared than adopting numerical approaches. 
4.3 Limitations and future developments 
While this research makes important contributions to alliance timing decisions, it also 
has some limitations. At the same time, these limitations represent potential 
opportunities to build upon this work for future research.  
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From a methodological perspective two limitations can arise related to the adoption of a 
closed-form solution, i.e. Black and Scholes model. First, in my models I have 
considered only economic risk, while it could be interesting integrating also technical 
uncertainty due to the high influence it has on the success of the drug R&D process. In 
this sense usually, numerical approaches are able to capture both technical and 
economic risk of the R&D process, on the contrary of the closed-form solutions that 
capture only the economic risk. However, Cassimon et al. (2011) developed a model to 
incorporate the technical risk in a n-fold compound option model, preserving the 
closed-form formula. Thus integrating this model could be the starting point for future 
researches. 
Second, I have developed a two-stage real option game model in which the first stage 
represents the discovery and clinical phases of the R&D process and the second stage 
represents the manufacturing and commercialization phase. However, considering that 
there are several phases in the field of the R&D process, consider a multiple stages 
game could have an important impact in terms of alliance timing decisions. In 
particular, signing the alliance at the appropriate R&D stage, and so including other 
exploration and exploitation phases would have a key impact in contract terms and 
profits for both companies. In this setting, the Back and Scholes formula is no more 
applicable as compound options should be considered by adopting the Geske model or 
numerical approaches. Even if the implementation of the model could result in a more 
complex computational setting, it is important to provide a complete picture of alliance 
design and timing decisions. 
From a theoretical point of view it could be possible to incorporate additional features 
to my framework in future studies. In this dissertation I have analysed the alliance 
timing decisions in a setting where the pharmaceutical company has the bargaining 
power to offer a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the competing biotech firms and she can 
terminate the project not exercising the option in case she expects a negative profit 
(even if the expected value of the R&D project is positive). However, in the real market 
biotech firms might enjoy some bargaining power (Lerner and Merges, 1998) so a fairer 
negotiation environment could be considered in future studies. In particular it could be 
possible developing a Nash bargaining game or including the possibility of re-
negotiating the contract terms to encourage the biotech firm in exercising the option. 
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In addition, I do not consider the possibility that the biotech firm could adopt an 
opportunistic behaviour leading to the moral hazard problem. Specifically, once signed 
the agreement, the biotech firm may misuse the payment from the pharmaceutical 
company for purposes not related to the agreement. Including this possibility is quite 
interesting and could result in an even greater incentive to postpone the alliance 
agreement. 
Also, I considered the competition between biotech firms. It would also be worthwhile 
to analyse a setting where also the pharmaceutical companies compete to ally with an 
innovative biotech firm to investigate whether my implications are robust in such new 
environment. These extensions could help to build a model, closer to reality, for the 
design of the alliance timing decisions. 
Finally, it could be noteworthy to underline that the alliance timing influences other 
aspects of the alliances so it could be interesting to expand the approach I have adopted 
so far, through an empirical analysis. For instance, an interesting further development 
could consist on analysing the role of the alliance timing as a driver for the biotech 
firms to signal their own quality. In this case alliance timing could help to explain how 
different types of signals interact each other. As stated in chapter 2, in R&D alliances 
adverse selection problems may arise due to the high information asymmetry on the 
quality of the biotech firms’ development projects. In order to mitigate these problems 
new ventures, i.e. biotech firms, can use many different types of signals to reveal their 
true quality to outsiders. Two of the main signals that can be sent from the new ventures 
are the involvement of venture capitalists (VCs) and alliances activity (Katila et al., 
2008). I suppose that also the phase of the R&D process in which the alliance is signed 
could be seen as a signal of the quality of the new venture.  
Indeed, on one side, new ventures seek to enter into alliances in early stages because 
they lack financial resources to develop a drug independently (Nicholson et al., 2005) 
and, in order to reduce information asymmetry they are forced to give up more control 
rights (Higgins, 2007, Lerner & Merges, 1998). On the contrary, in case of late stages 
agreements, new ventures look for manufacturing and marketing resources generally in 
the hands of established pharmaceutical firms. New ventures can reach higher payment 
conditions (Nicholson et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 2005) and more control rights (Higgins, 
2007). A late agreement signals to the market that the new venture owns not only the 
! 101!
necessary capabilities and know-how but also a strong financial structure that has let her 
to carry on the research on her own until these late stages. Moreover, having one or 
more candidate drugs in late stage of the R&D process means that the potential revenue 
coming from drug commercialization are less uncertain and closer (Ozmel et al., 2013b). 
My intuition is that timing of the alliances can explain if these two types of signal, i.e. 
venture capital and alliance, act as substitutes or complements and that it influences the 
new venture’s likelihood of future alliance formations and probability of going public or 
being acquired. ! !
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Appendix A 
Optimal pharmaceutical company’s payoffs in case of 
identical biotech firms 
A.1 SECOND STAGE – ROA and NPV methodology 
In order to sign an agreement in the second stage with B2, the profit of the 
pharmaceutical company must be positive. Then, his profit maximization problem is:  
 
max π s,B2
P (t1) =α sβδVs − Ps{ }         Eq. (A. 1) 
  s.t.  Ps > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδVs      Eq. (A. 2) 
 Ps > 0           Eq. (A. 3) 
Note that the minimum value of  α s  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α smin = 1−
1−γ
βδ
.         Eq. (A.4) 
Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.1) is linearly decreasing in  Ps , the optimal 
payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (A.4)) and the optimal payoff,
π s,B2
*P (t1) , is equal to π s,B2*P (t1) = βδVs − (1−γ )Vs . Note that * represents the optimal 
pharmaceutical company’s payoff. This payoff is positive when 1 γδ
β
−>  and this 
condition always holds as 1δ > , 0.5γ =  and β γ>  by assumption. Moving backward 
through the tree in Figure 9 reported in section 2.3, I compare π s,B2*P (t1)  with the 
pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff if he allies with B1 in the second stage (
π s,B1
*P (t1) ). This maximization problem is: 
max π s,B1P (t1) =α sβδVs − Ps{ }         Eq. (A.5) 
s.t.  Ps > (1− β )δVs − (1−α s )βδVs      Eq. (A.6) 
 Ps > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδVs       Eq. (A.7) 
 Ps > 0           Eq. (A.8) 
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Depending on the value of δ , Eq. A.6 is more stringent than Eq. A.7, then two cases 
arise, that I call low synergies, 1
1
γδ
β
−<
−
, and high synergies, 
 
δ > 1−γ
1− β
, respectively. 
Indeed, in case of low synergies Eq. (A.7) is more stringent and substituting it in the 
profit expression I obtain the optimal profit π s,B1*P (t1) = βδVs − (1−γ )Vs . Then, it is 
straightforward to see that this profit in case of alliance with B1 is identical to the profit 
when the pharmaceutical company allies with B2. Since B1’s profit is higher in case of 
alliance and the pharmaceutical company is indifferent between the two biotech firms, 
the sub-game equilibrium for the second stage would be an alliance with B1. 
In case of high synergies, the first constraint (Eq. (A.6)) is more stringent and, thus, 
π s,B1
*P (t1) = βδVs − (1− β )δVs .  By comparing the two profits π s,B2*P (t1)  and π s,B1*P (t1)  I obtain 
 π s,B2
*P (t1) > π s,B1
*P (t1)⇔ (1− β )δ > (1−γ ) , which always holds in case of high synergies. 
Thus, in this case, the sub-game equilibrium for the second stage is an alliance between 
the pharmaceutical company and B2. 
Next, I go back to the first stage decisions and distinguish the two cases of low and high 
synergies, respectively. 
A.2 FIRST STAGE 
A.2.1 Low synergies case 
 
δ < 1−γ
1− β
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 – ROA methodology 
In the first stage, I compare π s,B1*P (t0 )  with the pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff 
if he allies with B2 in the first stage (π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ), where the latter profit is obtained as a 
result of the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B2P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− Pf{ }      Eq. (A.9) 
s.t. Pf ,B2 > Cs,B1
B2 −Cf ,B2B2         Eq. (A.10) 
 
Pf > 0           Eq. (A.11) 
The minimum value of 
 
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
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α f min = 1−
(1− β )
β
        Eq. (A.12) 
This value is obtained imposing that Cs,B1B2 > Cf ,B2B2 . These are two call options with the 
same exercise price so I just compare their underlying values (see Table 12 reported in 
section 3.2.2). Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.9) is linearly decreasing in 
 
Pf , the 
optimal payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (A.12)) and π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is 
equal to π f ,B2*P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− (Cs,B1B2 −Cf ,B2B2 ) . 
Therefore I compare π f ,B2*P (t0 )  with π s,B1*P (t1)  backtracked to the first stage ( π s,B1
*P (t0 ) ). 
Specifically 
 
π s,B1
*P (t0 ) = (α sβδV f − Pse
−rt )N (d1(Cs,B1
B1 )) = (βδV f − (1−γ )V f )N (d1(Cs,B1
B1 )) . 
This comparison is ambiguous, in fact, first I notice that while 
 π1,B1
*P (t0 )  is independent 
from
 
α f , π f ,B2
*P (t0 )  is decreasing with  α f  (the proof is given in the Appendix C). 
However, even when π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is computed at  α f min , thus yielding 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ,α f min ) = (βδV0 − (1− β )δV0 )N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 )) , I cannot unambiguously rank the two 
profit expressions. Therefore, I distinguish again between two cases: in Case A I 
suppose that π s,B1*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ; in Case B I suppose that π s,B1*P (t0 ) < π f ,B2*P (t0 ) . 
A.2.1.1 Case A (π s,B1*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ) 
In Case A I compare at the same time t=t0,  π s,B1
*P (t0 )  with the optimal profit that the 
pharmaceutical company obtains if he allies with B1 in the first stage (π f ,B1*P (t0 )). The 
latter maximization problem is: 
max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− Pf{ }      Eq. (A.13) 
s.t. Pf > Cs,B1B1 −Cf ,B1B1         Eq. (A.14) 
Ps > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδVs       Eq. (A.15) 
Pf > Cs,B1B2 −Cf ,B2B2         Eq. (A.16) 
 
Pf > 0          Eq. (A.17) 
In order to demonstrate which constraint is more stringent I compare Cs,B1B1  with Cs,B1B2  
since Cf ,B1B1  and Cf ,B2
B2  are identical. Cs,B1B1  and Cs,B1B2  are two call options with the same 
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exercise price, so it suffices to compare the two underlying values and, substituting 
Pse−rt  in Eq. (A.13), holds Cs,B1B1 > Cs,B1B2 ⇔ (1−γ )Vf > (1− β )δVf , as I are in low synergies 
case. For  α s =α smin , the minimum value of  
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
(1−γ )
βδ         Eq. (A.18) 
This value is obtained imposing that Cs,B1B1 > Cf ,B1B1 . These are two call options with the 
same exercise price so I just compare their underlying values (see Table 12 reported in 
section 3.2.2).  
Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.13) is linearly decreasing in Pf , the optimal 
payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (A.18)) and π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is equal to: 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− (Cs,B1B1 −Cf ,B1B1 )      Eq. (A.19) 
Note that when π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is computed at  α f min , 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 ,α f min ) = (βδVf − (1−γ )Vf )N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 )) and thus  π s,B1
*P (t0 ) = π f ,B1
*P (t0 ,α0min ) . As  π s,B1
*P (t0 )  
is independent from 
 
α f  while π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  is decreasing with  α f  (the proof is given in 
Appendix C), I am sure that in Case A 
 
π s,B1
*P (t0 ) > π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  the equilibrium for the 
pharmaceutical company will be an alliance with B1 in the second stage. 
A.2.1.2 Case B (π s,B1*P (t0 ) < π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ) 
In Case B I compare π f ,B2*P (t0 )  with the optimal profit the pharmaceutical company 
obtains if he allies with B1 in the first stage (π f ,B1*P (t0 ) ). The latter maximization problem 
is: 
max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− Pf{ }      Eq. (A.20) 
s.t. Pf > Cf ,B2B1 −Cf ,B1B1        Eq. (A.21) 
Pf > Cs,B1B2 −Cf ,B2B2         Eq. (A.22) 
Pf > 0          Eq. (A.23) 
Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.20) is linearly decreasing in 
 
Pf  and the two 
constraints are identical (see Table 12 reported in section 3.2.2), the optimal payment is 
obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (A.12)) and π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is equal to 
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π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− (Cf ,B2B1 −Cf ,B1B1 ) . It is straightforward to see that π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is 
identical to π f ,B2*P (t0 ) , therefore the pharmaceutical company is indifferent between the 
two biotech firms and B1 will pre-empt the competitor. In Case B the equilibrium for 
the pharmaceutical company will be an alliance with B1 in the first stage. 
Therefore Case A and Case B do not arrive to the same solution and their comparison 
can be done only numerically (the reader can refer to section 3.3). 
A.2.2 High synergies case 
 
δ > 1−γ
1− β
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 – ROA methodology 
In the first stage, I compare π s,B2*P (t0 )  with the pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff 
if he allies with B2 in the first stage (π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ), where the latter profit is obtained as a 
result of the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B2P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− Pf{ }       Eq. (A.24) 
s.t. Pf > Cs,B2B2 −Cf ,B2B2         Eq. (A.25) 
Ps > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδVs        Eq. (A.26) 
 
Pf > 0           Eq. (A.27) 
The minimum value of 
 
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
1−γ
βδ
        Eq. (A.28) 
This value is obtained imposing that 
 
Pf > 0  andCs,B2B2 > Cf ,B2B2 . These are two call options 
with the same exercise price so I just compare their underlying values (see Table 12 
reported in section 3.2.2). Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.24) is linearly 
decreasing in 
 
Pf , the optimal payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. 
(A.28)) and π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is equal to π f ,B2*P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− (Cs,B2B2 −Cf ,B2B2 ) . Therefore 
I compare π f ,B2*P (t0 )  with π s,B2*P (t1)  backtracked to the first stage ( π s,B2
*P (t0 ) ). 
Specifically 
 
π s,B2
*P (t0 ) = (α sβδV f − Pse
−rt )N (d1(Cs,B2
B2 )) = (βδV f − (1−γ )V f )N (d1(Cs,B2
B2 )) . 
Note that when π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is computed at  α f min , 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ,α f min ) = (βδVf − (1−γ )Vf )N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))and thus  π s,B2
*P (t0 ) = π f ,B2
*P (t0 ,α0min ) . As  π s,B2
*P (t0 )  
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is independent from 
 
α f  while π f ,B2
*P (t0 )  is decreasing with  α f  (the proof is given in 
Appendix C), I am sure that 
 
π s,B2
*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) . 
Finally I compare 
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )  with the optimal profit in case the pharmaceutical company 
signs the agreement with B1 in the first stage (π f ,B1*P (t0 ) ). In particular π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is 
obtained by the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− Pf{ }      Eq. (A.29) 
s.t. Pf > Cs,B2B1 −Cf ,B1B1        Eq. (A.30) 
Ps > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδVs       Eq. (A.31) 
Pf > Cs,B2B2 −Cf ,B2B2         Eq. (A.32) 
 
Pf > 0          Eq. (A.33) 
In order to demonstrate which constraint is more stringent I compare Cs,B2B1  with Cs,B2B2  
since Cf ,B1B1  and Cf ,B2
B2  are identical. Cs,B2B1  and Cs,B2B2  are two call options with the same 
exercise price, so it suffices to compare the two underlying values and, substituting 
 Pse
−rt  in the expressions, holds Cs,B2B1 > Cs,B2B2 ⇔ (1− β )δVf > (1−γ )Vf , as I am in high 
synergies case. 
For  α s =α smin , the minimum value of  
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
(1− β )
β
        Eq. (A.34) 
This value is obtained imposing that Cs,B2B1 > Cf ,B1B1 . These are two call options with the 
same exercise price so I just compare their underlying values (see Table 12 reported in 
section 3.2.2).  
Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.29) is linearly decreasing in Pf , the optimal 
payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (A.34)) and π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is equal to: 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− (Cs,B2B1 −Cf ,B1B1 )      Eq. (A.35) 
The comparison between 
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )  and π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  is ambiguous, in fact, first I notice that 
while 
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )  is independent from 
α f , π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  is decreasing with  α f  (the proof is 
given in Appendix C). However, even when π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is computed at  α f min , thus 
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yielding π f ,B1*P (t0 ,α f min ) = (βδV0 − (1− β )δV0 )N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 )) , I cannot unambiguously rank the 
two profit expressions. 
However, comparing π f ,B1*P (t0 )  with π f ,B2*P (t0 ) , I notice that N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ) = N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ) and 
Cf ,B1B1 = Cf ,B2B2  in case of identical biotech firms, therefore π f ,B2*P (t0 ) > π f ,B1*P (t0 )⇔ Cs,B2B2 < Cf ,B2B1  
as I am in high synergies case. Since holds π s,B2*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2*P (t0 ) > π f ,B1*P (t0 )  I conclude that 
the optimal solution, under ROA methodology, for the pharmaceutical company in 
high synergies case is an alliance with B2 in the second stage. 
A.2.3 Low synergies case 
 
δ < 1−γ
1− β
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 – NPV methodology 
In the first stage, I compare π s,B1*P (t0 )  with the pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff 
if he allies with B2 in the first stage (π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ), where the latter profit is obtained as a 
result of the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B2P (t0 ) =α fβδVf − Pf{ }        Eq. (A.36) 
s.t.
 
Pf > (1− β )δV f − (1−α f )βδV f       Eq. (A.37) 
 
Pf > 0          Eq. (A.38) 
In this case the minimum value of 
 
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
1− β
β
.        Eq. (A.39) 
Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.36) is linearly decreasing in 
 
Pf , the optimal 
payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (A.39)) and π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is equal to 
 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) = βδV f − (1− β )δV f . Comparing the two profits I have 
 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) > π s,B1
*P (t0 )⇔ (1−γ ) > (1− β )δ , which always holds in case of low synergies. 
Finally I compare the pharmaceutical company’s profit if he chooses to establish the 
alliance in the first stage with B1 (π f ,B1*P (t0 ) ) with π f ,B2*P (t0 ) . In particular π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is 
obtained by the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B1*P (t0 ) =α fβδVf − Pf{ }        Eq. (A.40) 
s.t. 
 
Pf > (1− β )δV f − (1−α f )βδV f      Eq. (A.41) 
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Pf > (1− β )δV f − (1−α f )βδV f       Eq. (A.42) 
 
Pf > 0          Eq. (A.43) 
Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.40) is linearly decreasing in 
 
Pf  and the first two 
constraints are identical, the optimal payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., 
satisfying Eq. (A.39)) and π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is equal to  π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) = βδV f − (1− β )δV f . In low 
synergies case, also in the first stage the pharmaceutical company obtains the same 
profit from the two biotech firms and B1 decides to do pre-emption. Therefore the 
optimal solution, under the NPV methodology, for the pharmaceutical company in 
low synergies case is an alliance with B1 in the first stage. 
A.2.4 High synergies case 
 
δ > 1−γ
1− β
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 – NPV methodology 
In the first stage, I compare π s,B2*P (t0 )  with the pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff 
if he allies with B2 in the first stage (π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ), where the latter profit is obtained as a 
result of the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B2P (t0 ) =α fβδVf − Pf{ }        Eq. (A.44) 
s.t. 
 
Pf > (1−α s )βδV f + Pse
−rt − (1−α f )βδV f     Eq. (A.45) 
 Ps > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδVs       Eq. (A.46) 
 
Pf > 0          Eq. (A.47) 
In this case the minimum value of 
 
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
1−γ
βδ
.        Eq. (A.48) 
Since the profit expression in Eq. (A.44) is linearly decreasing in 
 
Pf , the optimal 
payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (A.48)) and π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is equal to 
 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) = βδV0 − (1−γ )V0 . Comparing π s,B2
*P (t0 )  and π f ,B2*P (t0 ) , the two profits are 
identical, so the pharmaceutical company is indifferent on which stage to choose. 
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Finally I compare the optimal profit obtained in case of alliance with B2 with π f ,B1*P (t0 )  
(pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff if he allies with B1 in the first stage). In 
particular π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is obtained by the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδVf − Pf{ }        Eq. (A.49) 
s.t. 
 
Pf > (1−α s )βδV f + Ps(t0 )− (1−α f )βδV f     Eq. (A.50) 
 Ps > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδVs )      Eq. (A.51) 
 
Pf > (1− β )δV f − (1−α f )βδV f       Eq. (A.52) 
 
Pf > 0          Eq. (A.53) 
Since I am in high synergies case, Eq. (A.51) is more stringent than the other constraints 
and, thus, π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is  π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) = βδV f − (1− β )δV f . 
Comparing the two payoffs always holds 
 
βδV f − (1−γ )V f > βδV f − (1− β )δV f  as I am in 
high synergies case. Therefore the optimal solution, under the NPV methodology, 
for the pharmaceutical company in high synergies case is an alliance with B2, but 
he is indifferent about the timing because he gets the same profit in each of the two 
stages. 
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Appendix B 
Optimal pharmaceutical company’s profit in case of non-
identical biotech firms 
B.1 SECOND STAGE – ROA and NPV methodology 
In order to sign an agreement in the second stage with B2, the profit of the 
pharmaceutical company must be positive. Then, his profit maximization problem is:  
max π s,B2P (t1) =α sβδ B2Vs − Ps,B2{ }       Eq. (B.1) 
s.t. Ps,B2 > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδ B2Vs      Eq. (B.2) 
Ps,B2 > 0          Eq. (B.3) 
Note that the minimum value of  α s  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α smin = 1−
(1−γ )
βδ B2
.         Eq. (B.4) 
Since the profit expression in Eq. (B.1) is linearly decreasing in Ps,B2 , the optimal 
payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (B.4)) and the optimal profit, 
π s,B2
*P (t1) , is equal to π s,B2*P (t1) = βδ B2Vs − (1−γ )Vs . 
This payoff is positive when 
 
δ B2 >
1−γ
β
 and this condition always holds as δB2 >1 , 
0.5γ =  and β > γ  by assumption. Moving backward through the tree in Figure 9 
reported in section 2.3, I compare π s,B2*P (t1)  with the pharmaceutical company’s optimal 
payoff if he allies with B1 in the second stage (π s,B1*P (t1) ). This maximization problem is: 
max π s,B1P (t1) =α sβδ B1Vs − Ps,B1{ }       Eq. (B.5) 
s.t. Ps,B1 > (1− β )δ B2Vs − (1−α s )βδ B1Vs       Eq. (B.6) 
Ps,B1 > 0           Eq. (B.7) 
Therefore π s,B1*P (t1) = βδ B1Vs − (1− β )δ B2Vs  as the minimum value of  α s  to ensure positive 
payments is 
 
α smin = 1−
(1− β )δ B2
βδ B1
. Then, two cases arise:  
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In Case 1, which corresponds to  δ B1  high in chapter 3, the second stage equilibrium 
yields an alliance with B1 if and only if π s,B1*P (t1) > π s,B2*P (t1) , which holds if and only if 
 δ B1 > (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β . Otherwise, if  δ B1 < (δ B2 − (1−γ )) β  the second stage equilibrium 
yields an alliance with B2, I refer to this case as Case 2, which corresponds to  δ B1  low 
in chapter 3. Next, I go back to first stage decisions and therefore the ROA 
methodology and the NPV methodology require a different discussion. 
B.2 FIRST STAGE  
B.2.1 Case 1 ( δ B1  high) – ROA methodology 
The maximization problem for the pharmaceutical company in case of alliance with B2 
in the first stage under ROA methodology is: 
max π f ,B2P (t0 ) =α fβδ B2Vf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− Pf ,B2{ }      Eq. (B.8) 
s.t. Pf ,B2 > Cs,B1B2 −Cf ,B2B2        Eq. (B.9) 
Pf ,B2 > 0          Eq. (B.10) 
The minimum value of 
 
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
(1− β )δ B1
βδ B2
        Eq. (B.11) 
This value is obtained imposing that Cs,B1B2 > Cf ,B2B2 . These are two call options with the 
same exercise price so I just compare their underlying values (see Table 12 reported in 
section 3.2.2). Since the profit expression in Eq. (B.8) is linearly decreasing in Pf ,B2 , the 
optimal payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (B.11)) and the optimal 
profit, π f ,B2*P (t0 ) , is equal to: 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) =α fβδ B2Vf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− (Cs,B1B2 −Cf ,B2B2 )     Eq. (B.12) 
Therefore I compare π f ,B2*P (t0 )  with π s,B1*P (t1)  backtracked to the first stage ( π s,B1
*P (t0 ) ). 
Specifically 
 
π s,B1
*P (t0 ) = (α sβδ B1V f − Ps,B1e
−rt )N (d1(Cs,B1
B1 )) = (βδ B1V f − (1− β )δ B2V f )N (d1(Cs,B1
B1 )) . 
This comparison is ambiguous, in fact, first I notice that while 
 π s,B1
*P (t0 )  is independent 
from 
 
α f , π f ,B2
*P (t0 )  decreases with  α f  (the proof is given in Appendix C). However, 
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even when π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is computed at  α f min , thus yielding 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ,α f min ) = (βδ B2Vf − (1− β )δ B1Vf )N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 )) , I cannot unambiguously rank the two 
profit expressions because, depending on the values of parameters δ B1  and δ B2 , either 
profit can be higher.  
Therefore, I distinguish between two cases: in Case A I suppose that π s,B1*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ; 
in Case B I suppose that π s,B1*P (t0 ) < π f ,B2*P (t0 ) . 
B.2.1.1 Case A (π s,B1*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ) 
In Case A I compare 
 π s,B1
*P (t0 )  with the optimal profit that the pharmaceutical company 
obtains if he allies with B1 in the first stage (π f ,B1*P (t0 ) ). The latter maximization problem 
is: 
max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδ B1Vf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− Pf ,B1{ }      Eq. (B.13) 
s.t. Pf ,B1 > Cs,B1B1 −Cf ,B1B1        Eq. (B.14) 
Ps,B1 > (1− β )δ B2Vs − (1−α s )βδ B1Vs      Eq. (B.15) 
Pf ,B1 > 0          Eq. (B.16) 
For  α s =α smin , the minimum value of  
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
(1− β )δ B2
βδ B1
        Eq. (B.17) 
This value is obtained imposing that Ps,B1 > 0  and Cs,B1B1 > Cf ,B1B1 . These are two call 
options with the same exercise price so I just compare their underlying values (see 
Table 12 reported in section 3.2.2). 
Since the profit expression in Eq. (B.13) is linearly decreasing in Pf ,B1 , the optimal 
payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (B.17)) and π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is equal to: 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) =α fβδ B1Vf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− (Cs,B1B1 −Cf ,B1B1 )     Eq. (B.18) 
Note that when π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is computed at  α f min , 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 ,α f min ) = (βδ B1Vf − (1− β )δ B2Vf )N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))  and thus  π s,B1
*P (t0 ) = π f ,B1
*P (t0 ,α f min ) . As 
 π s,B1
*P (t0 )  is independent from  
α f  while π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  is decreasing with  α f  (the proof is given 
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in Appendix C), in Case A the optimal solution for the pharmaceutical company is an 
alliance with B1 in the second stage. 
B.2.1.2 Case B (π s,B1*P (t0 ) < π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ) 
In Case B I compare π f ,B2*P (t0 )  with the optimal profit that the pharmaceutical company 
obtains if he allies with B1 in the first stage (π f ,B1*P (t0 ) ). The latter maximization problem 
is: 
max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδ B1Vf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− Pf ,B1{ }      Eq. (B.19) 
s.t. Pf ,B1 > Cf ,B2B1 −Cf ,B1B1        Eq. (B.20) 
Pf ,B1 > 0          Eq. (B.21) 
The minimum value of 
 
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
(1− β )δ B2
βδ B1
        Eq. (B.22) 
This value is obtained imposing that Cf ,B2B1 > Cf ,B1B1 . These are two call options with the 
same exercise price so I just compare their underlying values (see Table 12 reported in 
section 3.2.2). Since the profit expression in Eq. (B.19) is linearly decreasing in Pf ,B1 , 
the optimal payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (B.22)) and 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  is equal to π f ,B1*P (t0 ) =α fβδ B1Vf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− (Cf ,B2B1 −Cf ,B1B1 ) . 
Comparing the two profits always holds π f ,B1*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2*P (t0 )  as  δ B1 > δ B2  by assumption. 
Therefore in Case B the optimal solution for the pharmaceutical company will be an 
alliance with B1 in the first stage. 
I notice that in Case A holds 
 
π s,B1
*P (t0 ) > π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  while in Case B holds π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2*P (t0 ) , 
therefore I can conclude that 
 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) < π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) < π s,B1
*P (t0 )  and Case A dominates Case B. 
The optimal solution, under ROA methodology, for the pharmaceutical company 
in Case 1 is an alliance with B1 in the second stage. 
B.2.2 Case 2 ( δ B1  low) – ROA methodology 
The maximization problem for the pharmaceutical company in case of alliance with B2 
in the first stage under ROA methodology is: 
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max π f ,B2P (t0 ) =α fβδ B2Vf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− Pf ,B2{ }      Eq. (B.23) 
s.t. Pf ,B2 > Cf ,B2B2 −Cf ,B2B2        Eq. (B.24) 
Ps,B2 > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδ B2Vs       Eq. (B.25) 
Pf ,B2 > 0          Eq. (B.26) 
For  α s =α smin , in order to get positive payments I impose that Cs,B2
B2 > Cf ,B2B2 . These two 
call options have the same exercise price (see Table 12 reported in section 3.2.2) so I 
just compare their underlying values and the minimum value of 
 
α f  to ensure positive 
payments is: 
 
α f min = 1−
(1−γ )
βδ B2
.        Eq. (B.27) 
Since the profit expression in Eq. (B.23) is linearly decreasing in Pf ,B2 , the optimal 
payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (B.27)) and π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is equal to  
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) =α fβδ B2Vf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− (Cs,B2B2 −Cf ,B2B2 ) . 
Therefore I compare π f ,B2*P (t0 )  with π s,B2*P (t1)  backtracked to the first stage ( π s,B2
*P (t0 ) ). 
Specifically, π s,B2
*P (t0 ) = (α sβδ B2Vf − Ps,B2e−rt )N (d1(Cs,B2B2 )) = (βδ B2Vf − (1−γ )Vf )N (d1(Cs,B2B2 )) . 
Note that when π f ,B2*P (t0 )  is computed at  α f min , 
π f ,B2
*P (t0 ,α f min ) = (βδ B2Vf − (1−γ )Vf )N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))  and thus  π s,B2
*P (t0 ) = π f ,B2
*P (α f min ,t0 ) . As 
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )  is independent from  
α f  while π f ,B2
*P (t0 )  is decreasing with  α f  (the proof is 
given in Appendix C), thus is always verified that 
 
π s,B2
*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) . 
Finally I compare 
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )  with the optimal profit that the pharmaceutical company 
obtains if he allies with B1 in the first stage (π f ,B1*P (t0 ) ). This maximization problem is: 
max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδ B1Vf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− Pf ,B1{ }      Eq. (B.28) 
s.t. Pf ,B1 > Cf ,B2B1 −Cf ,B1B1        Eq. (B.29) 
Pf ,B1 > 0          Eq. (B.30) 
The minimum value of 
 
α f  to ensure positive payments is: 
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α f min = 1−
(1− β )δ B2
βδ B1
        Eq. (B.31) 
This value is obtained imposing that Cf ,B2B1 > Cf ,B1B1 . These are two call options with the 
same exercise price so I just compare their underlying values (see Table 12 reported in 
section 3.2.2). Since the profit expression in Eq. (B.28) is linearly decreasing in Pf ,B1 , 
the optimal payment is obtained at the boundary (i.e., satisfying Eq. (B.31)) and 
π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  is equal to π f ,B1*P (t0 ) =α fβδ B1Vf N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 ))− (Cf ,B2B1 −Cf ,B1B1 ) . 
The last comparison between 
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )  and π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  is ambiguous, in fact, first I notice 
that while 
 π s,B2
*P (t0 )  is independent from  
α f , π f ,B1
*P (t0 )  decreases with  α f  (the proof is is 
given in Appendix C). However, even when π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is computed at  α f min , thus 
yielding π f ,B1*P (t0 ) = (βδ B1Vf − (1− β )δ B2Vf )N (d1(Cf ,B1B1 )) , I cannot unambiguously rank the 
two profit expressions. Therefore, their comparison can be done only numerically (the 
reader can refer to section 3.4). 
B.2.3 Case 1 – NPV methodology 
In the first stage, I compare π s,B1*P (t0 )  with the pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff 
if he allies with B2 in the first stage (π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ), where the latter profit is obtained as a 
result of the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B2P (t0 ) =α fβδ B2Vf − Pf ,B2{ }       Eq. (B.32) 
s.t. Pf ,B2 > (1− β )δ B1Vf − (1−α f )βδ B2Vf       Eq. (B.33) 
Pf ,B2 > 0           Eq. (B.34) 
Therefore π f ,B2*P (t0 ) = βδ B2Vf − (1− β )δ B1Vf  as the minimum value of  α f  to ensure positive 
payments is 
 
α f min = 1−
(1− β )δ B1
βδ B2
. Comparing π f ,B2*P (t0 )  with π s,B1*P (t0 )  holds 
 
π s,B1
*P (t0 ) > π f ,B2
*P (t0 )⇔δ B1 > δ B2  and this condition always holds by assumption. Finally I 
compare the pharmaceutical company’s profit if he chooses to establish the alliance in 
the first stage with B1 π f ,B1*P (t0 )  with π s,B1*P (t0 ) . In particular π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is obtained by the 
following profit maximization problem: 
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max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδ B1Vf − Pf ,B1{ }       Eq. (B.35) 
s.t. Pf ,B1 > (1−α s )βδ B1Vf + Ps,B1e−rt − (1−α f )βδ B1Vf     Eq. (B.36) 
Ps,B1 > (1− β )δ B2Vs − (1−α s )βδ B1Vs       Eq. (B.37) 
Pf ,B1 > 0           Eq. (B.38) 
Therefore π f ,B1P (t0 ) = βδ B1Vf − (1− β )δ B2Vf  as the minimum value of  α f  to ensure positive 
payments is 
 
α f min = 1−
(1− β )δ B2
βδ B1
. Then, it is straightforward to see that this profit in 
case of alliance with B1 in the first stage is identical to the profit when the 
pharmaceutical company allies with B1 in the second stage. Therefore the optimal 
solution, under NPV methodology, for the pharmaceutical company in Case 1 is an 
alliance with B1 and he obtains the same profit in each of the two stages. 
B.2.4 Case 2 – NPV methodology 
In the first stage, I compare π s,B2*P (t0 )  with the pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff 
if he allies with B2 in the first stage (π f ,B2*P (t0 ) ), where the latter profit is obtained as a 
result of the following profit maximization problem: 
max π f ,B2P (t0 ) =α fβδ B2Vf − Pf ,B2{ }       Eq. (B.39) 
s.t. Pf ,B2 > (1−α s )βδ B2Vf + Ps,B2e−rt − (1−α f )βδ B2Vf    Eq. (B.40) 
Ps,B2 > (1−γ )Vs − (1−α s )βδ B2Vs       Eq. (B.41) 
Pf ,B2 > 0          Eq. (B.42) 
Therefore π f ,B2*P (t0 ) = βδ B2Vf − (1−γ )Vf  as the minimum value of  α f  to ensure positive 
payments is 
 
α f min = 1−
1−γ
βδ B2
. Comparing π f ,B2*P (t0 )  with π s,B2*P (t0 )  it is straightforward to 
see that the two profits are identical, so the pharmaceutical company is indifferent on 
which stage to choose. Finally I compare the optimal profit obtained in case of alliance 
with B2 with π f ,B1*P (t0 )  (pharmaceutical company’s optimal payoff if he allies with B1 in 
the first stage). In particular π f ,B1*P (t0 )  is obtained by the following profit maximization 
problem: 
max π f ,B1P (t0 ) =α fβδ B1Vf − Pf ,B1{ }       Eq. (B.43) 
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s.t. Pf ,B1 > (1− β )δ B2Vf − (1−α f )βδ B1Vf      Eq. (B.44) 
Pf ,B1 > 0          Eq. (B.45) 
Therefore π f ,B1*P (t0 ) = βδ B1Vf − (1− β )δ B2Vf  as the minimum value of  α f  to ensure positive 
payments is 
 
α f min = 1−
(1− β )δ B2
βδ B1
. Comparing the optimal profit obtained in case of 
alliance with B2 with π f ,B1*P (t0 )  holds  π f ,B1
*P (t0 ) < π s,B2
*P (t0 ) = π f ,B2
*P (t0 )⇔βδ B1 < δ B2 − (1−γ )  
and this condition is always satisfied in Case 2. Therefore the optimal solution, under 
NPV methodology, for the pharmaceutical company in Case 2 is an alliance with 
B2 and he obtains the same profit in each of the two stages. 
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Appendix C 
In this appendix I prove that, in case of high synergies and identical biotech firms (see 
Appendix A),  π f ,B2
*P (t0 )  decreases as α f  increases, i.e. 
 
∂π f ,B2
*P (t0 )
∂α f
< 0 . 
As stated in Appendix A, since B1 and B2 are identical (i.e. δ B1 = δ B2 = δ >1 ), this 
payoff is equal to: π f ,B2*P (t0 ) =α fβδVf N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 ))− (Cs,B2B2 −Cf ,B2B2 ) . To better understand my 
proof I need to rewrite this  π f ,B2
*P (t0 )  expression. 
For the sake of tractability I express Cf ,B2B2  as: 
 
C f ,B2
B2 = S f ,B2
B2 N (d1(S f ,B2
B2 ; X f ,B2
B2 ))− e−rτ X f ,B2
B2 N (d2 (S f ,B2
B2 ; X f ,B2
B2 )) =
= ((1−α f )βδ B2Vf )N (d1((1−α f )βδ B2Vf ; Is ))− e
−rτ IsN (d2 ((1−α f )βδ B2Vf ; Is ))
 Eq. (C.1) 
Where Sf ,B2B2  and X f ,B2B2  represent underlying and exercise price of the related option 
Cf ,B2B2  and assume values equal to (1−α f )βδ B2Vf  and Is, respectively (see Table 12 in 
section 3.2.2 for the values). 
I can also express Cs,B2B2  as: 
 
Cs,B2
B2 = Ss,B2
B2 N (d1(Ss,B2
B2 ; Xs,B2
B2 ))− e−rτ Xs,B2
B2 N (d2 (Ss,B2
B2 ; Xs,B2
B2 )) =
= ((1−α s )βδ B2Vf + Ps,B2e
−rτ )N (d1((1−α s )βδ B2Vf + Ps,B2e
−rτ ; Is )−
−e−rτ IsN (d2 ((1−α s )βδ B2Vf + Ps,B2e
−rτ ; Is ))
  Eq. (C.2) 
Where  Ss,B2
B2  and  Xs,B2
B2  represent underlying and exercise price of the related option Cs,B2B2  
and assume values equal to (1−α s )βδ B2Vf + Ps,B2e−rτ  and Is respectively (see Table 12 in 
section 3.2.2 for the values). In particular, being Ps,B2e−rτ = (1−γ )Vf − (1−α s )βδVf  (as I 
have derived in Eq. (A.26) in Appendix A), substituting Ps,B2e−rτ  in  Ss,B2
B2  expression I 
obtain  Ss,B2
B2 = (1−γ )Vf . 
For the sake of clarity, in the following I will indicate: 
N (d1(Cf ,B2B2 )) = N (d1f ,B2B2 )         Eq. (C.3) 
 N (d2 (C f ,B2
B2 )) = N (d2f ,B2
B2 )         Eq. (C.4) 
N (d1(Cs,B2B2 )) = N (d1s,B2B2 )         Eq. (C.5) 
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 N (d2 (Cs,B2
B2 )) = N (d2s,B2
B2 )         Eq. (C.6) 
Where Sf ,B2B2 , X f ,B2B2 , Ss,B2B2  and  Xs,B2
B2  have the same meaning as before (for N (d1)  and 
N (d2 )  expressions the reader can refer to equation (8) and equation (9) in section 
1.1.2). It is helpful to notice that Eq. (C.5) and Eq. (C.6) are independent of α f . 
Therefore, I can also write  π f ,B2
*P (t0 )  as: 
 π f ,B2
*P (t0 ) = βδVf N (d1f ,B2
B2 )− e−rτ IsN (d2f ,B2
B2 )− (1−γ )Vf N (d1s,B2
B2 )+ e−rτ IsN (d2s,B2
B2 )  Eq. (C.7) 
It follows that proving 
 
∂π f ,B2
*P (t0 )
∂α f
< 0 , means proving that: 
 
∂(βδVf N (d1f ,B2
B2 )− e−rτ IsN (d2f ,B2
B2 )− (1−γ )Vf N (d1s,B2
B2 )+ e−rτ IsN (d2s,B2
B2 ))
∂α f
< 0  Eq. (C.8) 
 
∂βδVf N (d1f ,B2
B2 )
∂α f
−
∂e−rτ IsN (d2f ,B2
B2 )
∂α f
< 0       Eq. (C.9) 
 
βδVf
∂N (d1f ,B2
B2 )
∂α f
− e−rτ Is
∂N (d2f ,B2
B2 )
∂α f
< 0       Eq. (C.10) 
 
βδVf
∂N (d1f ,B2
B2 )
∂d1f ,B2
B2
∂d1f ,B2
B2
∂S f ,B2
B2
∂S f ,B2
B2
∂α f
− e−rτ Is
∂N (d2f ,B2
B2 )
∂d2f ,B2
B2
∂d2f ,B2
B2
∂S f ,B2
B2
∂S f ,B2
B2
∂α f
< 0   Eq. (C.11) 
 
βδVf
exp(−(d1f ,B2
B2 )2 / 2)
2π
1
βδVf (1−α f )σ τ
(−βδVf ) <
< e−rτ Is
exp(−(d1f ,B2
B2 )2 / 2)βδVf (1−α f )e
rτ
2π Is
1
βδVf (1−α f )σ τ
(−βδVf )
  Eq. (C.12) 
 1> (1−α f )          Eq. (C.13) 
Eq. (C.13) always holds for values of α f  in the range (0,1). Thus  π f ,B2
*P (t0 )  decreases as 
α f  increases. 
This proof could be extended to the other pharmaceutical company’s profits calculated 
with ROA methodology in Appendix A and Appendix B. 
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